LIBRARY 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


Class 


MCDOWELL  AND  TYLER 


CAMPAIGN  OF  BULL  RUN 


JAMES    B.    FRY, 

RETIRED. 

Assistant  Adj't-General,  with  Rank  of  Colonel. 

Brevet-Major-General  U.  S.  A. 
Adj't-Gen'l  to  Gen'l  McDowell,  from  May  to  Nov.,  '61. 


NEW    YORK: 
D.  VAN  NOSTRAND,  PUBLISHER, 

1884, 


COPYRIGHT,  D.  VAN  NOSTKAND,  18S4. 


PREFACE. 

AMEMOEIAL  volume  of  the  late  General  Daniel 
Tyler  contains  an  account  by  him  of  the  Bull 
Bun  campaign  of  1861.  This  account  does  great 
wrong  to  the  commanding  General  in  that  campaign. 
The  volume  is  edited  by  the  distinguished  author 
Donald  G.  Mitchel.  The  title  page  says  that  "two 
hundred  copies  of  this  volume  have  been  privately 
printed  by  Tuttle,  Morehouse  and  Taylor,  New  Haven." 
It  is  stated  in  the  preface  that  "  the  volume  opens 
with  a  fragment  of  autobiography  written  at  the  in 
stance  of  his  esteemed  friend  Major-General  George 
W.  Cullum,  who  proposed  preparing  from  it  his  biog 
raphy  for  the  West  Point  Alumni  Association.  This 
fact  will  explain  its  comparative  reticence  with  respect 
to  his  private  lite,  and  its  fullness  in  military  and  en 
gineering  details.  It  is  believed  that  he  had  fully  in 
tended  its  completion,  but  the  cares  of  business  and 
the  infirmities  of  age  unfortunately  forbade.  Yet  his 
friends  will  recognize  in  this  fragment  his  straight 
forwardness;  his  sturdy  outspoken  positiveness  of 
opinion  ;  his  ever- active  energy  ;  and  they  will  not  be 
sorry  to  see,  in  this  record  of  his,  traces  of  his  courage 
in  maintaining  his  own  convictions— of  his  directness 

225759 


4  PREFACE. 

of  speech,  and  of  his  honest  wrath  at  what  he  counted 
(perhaps  sometimes  hastily)  vaporous  incompetence, 
wherever  encountered." 

The  contents  of  memorial  volumes  privately  printed 
are  not,  usually,  proper  subjects  for  criticism.  But 
this  is  an  exception.  De  mortuis  nil  nisi  bonum  is 
a  worthy  maxim  ;  but  the  living  are  entitled  to  some 
thing.  General  Tyler  wrote  an  account  of  the  cam 
paign  of  Bull  Kun,  and  sent  it  to  General  Cullurn 
for  history.  General  Cullum  has  not  published  it,  but 
it  has  been  printed,  distributed,  deposited  in  public 
libraries,  and  reviewed  in  at  least  one  newspaper. 
The  subject  treated  by  General  Tyler  is  public,  his 
toric  and  important.  For  the  foregoing  reasons  it 
has  been  deemed  fair  to  subject  his  Autobiography  to 
examination  by  the  records,  notwithstanding  he  is 
dead  and  his  contribution  to  history  appears  in  a  memo 
rial  volume.  When  a  man  writing  of  those  associated 
with  him  in  the  defence  of  his  country,  makes  defama 
tory  allegations  which  are  contradicted  by  official  re 
ports  and  sworn  statements — his  own  among  them, 
recorded  twenty  years  before — dead  or  alive,  his  mis 
takes  should  be  pointed  out. 

J.  B.  F. 

NEW  YORK  CITY,  May,  1884. 


INTRODUCTORY. 

rPHE  New  York  Evening  Post  some  weeks 
•*-  ago  contained  a  communication  entitled 
"New  Memoirs  of  the  War  of  the  Rebel 
lion"  —"Reminiscences  of  a  Gallant  Soldier." 
Under  these  striking  captions  a  review  was 
given  of  what  is  called  a  memorial  volume, 
"in  part  an  autobiography  of  the  late  Gen 
eral  Daniel  Tyler."  The  printing  of  this 
volume,  it  is  said  in  the  Post,  "illustrates 
and  confirms  the  correctness  of  a  remark  often 
made,  that  the  true  and  full  history  of  theWar  of 
the  Rebellion  cannot  be  written  until  sufficient 
time  has  elapsed  to  allow  the  many  diaries, 
letters  and  private  papers  of  the  chief  partici 
pants  in  its  stirring  scenes  to  be  made  accessible, 
consequent  upon  their  death,  to  the  gene 
ral  public.  For  this  volume  contains  a  new 
and  unpublished  account  of  the  first  battle  of 
Bull  Run,  July  20,  1861"  (should  be  21),  "and 
of  the  preceding  skirmish  of  Blackburn' s  Ford, 
July  17"  (should  be  18),  "  written  by  the 
subject  of  this  memoir,  who,  it  will  be  remem 
bered,  was  in  immediate  command  of  the 
troops  engaged  in  the  skirmish,  and  second 


6  INTRODUCTORY. 

in  command  under  McDowell  on  the  day  of  the 
battle."  It  is  due  to  McDowell,  as  well  as  to 
history,  that  the  account  of  Blackburn's  Ford 
and  Bull  Run  here  mentioned,  written  by 
Tyler  himself,  under  date  of  May  1,  1881,  to 
be  used  after  his  death,  and  now  given  to  the 
"general  public"  by  his  friends,  should  be 
somewhat  carefully  considered.  It  is  strange 
that  a  man  of  Tyler's  ability  and  experience 
could,  without  referring  to  the  records,  write, 
in  his  memoir,  an  account  of  military  operations 
which  took  place  nearly  twenty  years  before. 
Feeling  some  apprehension  in  writing  from 
memory,  he  says  :  "  This  ends  my  recollections 
of  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  and  of  my  official  con 
nection  therewith  Since  it  is  now  some  twenty- 
three"  (it  was  not  twenty)  "  years  since  this 
unfortunate  battle  was  fought,  I  may  have 
made  some  mistakes,  although  I  think  not ; 
but  before  completing  this  memoir  I  purpose 
to  examine  the  official  reports  of  that  battle, 
converse  with  such  officers  as  were  connected 
with  me  in  the  contest,  and  correct  any  mis 
takes  or  errors  which  may  be  contained  in  this 
part  of  my  memoirs."  That  he  did  not  suc 
ceed  in  correcting  all  the  mistakes  and  errors, 
if  he  made  any  examination  at  all,  will  appear 
further  on. 


MCDOWELL -HIS  APPOINTMENT- 

HIS  ARMY-TYLER. 


WHEN  the  year  1861  opened,  McDowell, 
forty -three  years  of  age,  and  in  the  full 
vigor  of  manhood,  was  a  major  in  the  Adjutant- 
General'  s  Department.  His  habits  were  unex 
ceptionable,  and  he  was  blessed  with  good  health 
and  great  physical  power.  Schooled,  as  a  youth, 
in  France,  and  graduated  from  the  Military 
Academy  (1838),  he  was  always  a  close  student 
of  his  profession,  and  was  well  informed  upon 
general  subjects,  but  was  without  political 
antecedents  or  acquaintances.  He  was  one  of 
the  most  active  soldiers  of  his  day  and  gained 
distinction  in  the  Mexican  War.  Full  of  energy 
and  patriotism,  when  the  crisis  approached  in 
1861,  he  was  positive  in  his  opinions  and  clear 
and  forcible  in  the  expression  of  them.  He 
insisted  that  all  efforts  to  conciliate  would  fail, 
that  the  Southern  States,  one  after  another, 
would  be  dragged  into  secession,  that  war  was 
inevitable,  and  that  it  was  the  plain  duty  of  the 


8  MCDOWELL   AND    TYLER. 

government  to  prepare  for  it  with  all  possible 
dispatch.  He  was  on  duty  in  Washington 
inspecting  the  regular  troops  assembled  there 
prior  to  the  inauguration  of  President  Lincoln. 
Highly  esteemed  by  General  Scott  and  gaining 
the  confidence  and  friendship  of  Secretary 
Chase,  it  is  not  strange  that  McDowell  was  the 
first  junior  officer  to  attract  attention  from  that 
administration  which  met  rebellion  at  the  thresh 
old  of  the  White  House  on  the  4th  of  March, 
1861.  He  was  assigned  to  mustering  and  .organ 
izing  the  militia  of  the  district,  and  was  in  com 
mand  of  the  Capital  during  part  of  April  and 
May.  The  seventy-five  thousand  three-months' 
men  called  for  by  the  President's  proclamation 
of  the  15th  of  April  were  assembling  at  the  Cap 
ital,  and  it  was  necessary  to  have  commanders 
for  them.  McDowell  was  appointed  Brigadier- 
General  in  the  regular  army,  May  14, 1861 .  Prior 
to  that,  Colonel  J.  K.  F.  Mansfield,  Inspector- 
General,  an  officer  in  whom  General  Scott  re 
posed  great  confidence,  was  assigned  to  com 
mand  in  Washington.  Mansfield  was  McDow 
ell's  senior.  He  entered  the  army  in  1822,  and 
held  the  grade  of  colonel,  whereas  McDowell 
entered  in  1838,  and  (prior  to  his  selection 
for  brigadier)  was  only  a  major.  Though  he 
thought  highly  of  McDowell,  General  Scott 
was  not  in  favor  of  his  sudden  advancement  to 
the  grade  of  brigadier -general,  and  was  quite 


BULL    RUN    CAMPAIGN,  1861.  9 

unwilling  that  he  should  be  put  above  Mans 
field.  As  soon,  therefore,  as  practicable  after 
the  President  promoted  McDowell,  General 
Scott  insisted  that  Mansfield  should  be  promo 
ted  to  the  same  grade  with  the  same  date  (May 
14  ,  thus  preserving  the  military  superiority 
of  the  latter.  The  Secretary  of  War  expressed 
to  McDowell  a  purpose  to  appoint  him  Major- 
General,  but  McDowell  was  unwilling  under 
the  circumstances  to  accept  so  high  a  grade. 

After  the  troops  had  been  thrown  across  the 
Potomac  by  Mansfield  during  the  night  of  May 
23-4,  General  Scott  was  told  that  he  must  send 
either  Mansfield  or  McDowell  there  to  com 
mand.  He  did  not  wish  to  send  either,  but 
was  wholly  unwilling  to  relieve  Mansfield  from 
command  in  Washington.  Hence  he  ordered 
McDowell.  But  he  advised  McDowell  to  make 
a  personal  request  of  the  Secretary  of  War  not 
to  be  assigned  to  that  command.  McDowell 
thought  he  could  not  do  that.  He  had  just 
been  appointed  a  General  Officer,  and  he  felt 
bound  to  enter  promptly  and  cheerfully  upon 
the  first  duty  to  which  the  government  assigned 
him.  His  refusal  piqued  General  Scott,  and 
created,  on  his  part,  a  coldness  towards  Mc 
Dowell. 

The  enemy  was  at  that  time  concentrating 
south  of  the  Potomac  almost  in  sight  of  the 
dome  of  the  Capitol.  McDowell's  assignment 


10  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLEK. 

not  only  deprived  Mansfield  of  a  part  of  his 
command,  but  of  the  most  conspicuous  part, 
that  in  front  of  the  foe.  A  little  jealousy  of 
McDowell  arose  in  the  army  circles  about  the 
headquarters  of  General  Scott,  and  Mansfield 
himself  was  dissatisfied.  In  his  diary  of  Sept. 
8,  1862,  Secretary  Chase  made  the  entry, 
"  General  Mansfield  came  in  and  talked  very 
earnestly.  *  *  He  spoke  of  Gen.  Scott,  said 
he  had  not  treated  him  well ;  had  placed 
McDowell  in  command  over  the  river  last  year, 
superseding  himself.  *  *  He  felt  himself 
wronged,  but  did  his  duty  to  the  best  of  his 
ability,"  etc.  (Warden's  "An  account  of  the 
private  and  public  services  of  Salmon  P. 
Chase,"  p.  466.) 

As  the  Union  forces  arrived  in  Washington 
from  the  north  they  necessarily  reported  to 
Mansfield,  and  became  for  the  time  a  part  of 
his  command.  He  attended  diligently  to  the 
duty  of  equipping  and  preparing  the  troops 
for  the  field,  but  every  officer  and  enlisted  man 
who  was  sent  across  the  Potomac  changed  the 
relieved  importance  of  Mansfield  and  McDowell 
by  reducing  the  command  of  the  former  arid 
increasing  that  of  the  latter.  In  his  testimony 
before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  McDowell  says  :  ' '  General  Mansfield  felt 
hurt,  I  have  no  doubt,  in  seeing  the  command 
he  had  divided  in  two  and  a  portion  sent  over 


BULL   RUN    CAMPAIGN,  1861.  11 

there.  I  got  everything  with  great  difficulty. 
Some  of  my  regiments  came  over  very  late  ; 
some  of  them  not  until  the  very  day  I  was  to 
move  the  army."  When  he  appealed  to  Mans 
field  to  hurry  forward  the  troops,  the  excuse 
was  they  were  not  supplied  with  baggage  wag 
ons.  When  this  was  reported  to  the  Quarter 
master  General,  his  answer  was  that  he  could 
furnish  the  transportation,  but  Mansfield  did 


ERRATA. 

Page  10  ;  seventh  liDe  from  bottom,  for  "  relieved 
ead  "relative." 

Page  40  ;  top  line,  for  "  latent"  read  "talent." 


his  wants  partially  supplied.  He  failed  to 
secure  transportation  to  carry  rations  with 
his  army,  and  had  to  march  trusting  that 
wagon-trains  would  be  made  up,  loaded  with 
provisions  and  sent  to  follow  him. 

He  met  with  much  difficulty  in  getting  officers 
of  experience  to  command  divisions  and  bri 
gades.  His  division  commanders  were,  Briga 
dier-General  Daniel  Tyler,  Connecticut  Vols.; 
Brigadier-General  Theodore  Runyon.  New  Jer 
sey  Vols.,  and  Colonels  Hunter,  Heintzleman 
and  Miles  of  the  regular  army. 


10  MCDOWELL   AND    TYLER. 

not  only  deprived  Mansfield  of  a  part  of  his 
command,  but  of  the  most  conspicuous  part, 
that  in  front  of  the  foe.  A  little  jealousy  of 
McDowell  arose  in  the  army  circles  about  the 
headquarters  of  General  Scott,  and  Mansfield 
himself  was  dissatisfied.  In  his  diary  of  Sept. 
8,  I«fi2.  Secretary  Chase  made  the  entry, 
"  Gc  -~~~o  in  an(j  talked  very 

earn  :* 

he 
Me1 

SUJ 

wr< 

ab: 

pr 

Chase,"  p.  4ou.; 

As  the  Union  forces  arrived  in  w  a^^^0 
from  the  north  they  necessarily  reported  to 
Mansfield,  and  became  for  the  time  a  part  of 
his  command.  He  attended  diligently  to  the 
duty  of  equipping  and  preparing  the  troops 
for  the  field,  but  every  officer  and  enlisted  man 
who  was  sent  across  the  Potomac  changed  the 
relieved  importance  of  Mansfield  and  McDowell 
by  reducing  the  command  of  the  former  arid 
increasing  that  of  the  latter.  In  his  testimony 
before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  McDowell  says  :  ' '  General  Mansfield  felt 
hurt,  I  have  no  doubt,  in  seeing  the  command 
he  had  divided  in  two  and  a  portion  sent  over 


BULL    RUN    CAMPAIGN,  1861.  11 

there.  I  got  everything  with  great  difficulty. 
Some  of  my  regiments  came  over  very  late  ; 
some  of  them  not  until  the  very  day  I  was  to 
move  the  army."  When  he  appealed  to  Mans 
field  to  hurry  forward  the  troops,  the  excuse 
was  they  were  not  supplied  with  baggage  wag 
ons.  When  this  was  reported  to  the  Quarter 
master  General,  his  answer  was  that  he  could 
furnish  the  transportation,  but  Mansfield  did 
not  want  it  till  the  troops  should  move.  The 
result  was,  the  troops  which  McDowell  was  to 
lead  had  not  all  been  sent  to  him  by  Mansfield 
before  the  day  fixed  by  General  Scott  for 
McDowell's  advance.  Some  of  them  did  not 
join  until  the  Sunday  before  he  advanced,  and 
some  not  until  the  very  Tuesday  on  which 
he  marched  to  the  front.  It  was  only  by 
great  exertion  that  he  succeeded  in  having 
his  wants  partially  supplied.  He  failed  to 
secure  transportation  to  carry  rations  with 
his  army,  and  had  to  march  trusting  that 
wagon-trains  would  be  made  up,  loaded  with 
provisions  and  sent  to  follow  him. 

He  met  with  much  difficulty  in  getting  officers 
of  experience  to  command  divisions  and  bri 
gades.  His  division  commanders  were,  Briga 
dier-General  Daniel  Tyler,  Connecticut  Vols.; 
Brigadier-General  Theodore  Runyon.  New  Jer 
sey  Vols.,  and  Colonels  Hunter,  Heintzleman 
and  Miles  of  the  regular  army. 


MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 


At  that  time  Tyler  was  in  Ms  sixty-second 
year,  having  been  graduated  at  the  U.  S. 
Military  Academy  in  1819,  and  appointed  2d 
Lieutenant  of  Artillery.  He  remained  in  the 
service  as  lieutenant  until  1834,  when  he 
resigned,  dissatisfied  at  President  Jackson's 
refusal  to  appoint  him  captain  in  the  new 
ordnance  corps.  He  was  the  veteran  of  Mc 
Dowell'  s  army  in  1861 .  The  organization  of  that 
army  was: — Tyler's  (1st)  Division,  4  brigades, 
9,936  men,  four  batteries  of  artillery  and  a 
squadron  of  cavalry  ;  Hunter' s  (2d)  Division,  2 
brigades,  2,648  men,  two  and  a  half  batteries  of 
artillery,  and  5  companies  of  cavalry  ;  Heintz- 
leman's  (3d)  Division,  3  brigades,  9,777  men, 
two  batteries  of  artillery ;  Miles'  (5th)  Di 
vision,  2  brigades,  6,207  men,  three  batteries  of 
artillery,  and  Runyon's  (4th  Reserve)  Division, 
5,752  men,  not  divided  into  brigades.  Notwith 
standing  the  fact  that  three  of  the  division 
commanders — Hunter,  Heintzleman  and  Miles 
had  spent  their  lives  in  the  military  service 
which  Tyler  had  left  twenty-seven  years  before, 
and  were  not  greatly  his  juniors  in  years, 
McDowell  gave  Tyler  the  first  and  largest 
division,  and  entrusted  him  with  the  honor  of 
the  advance  in  the  movement  upon  the  enemy. 
This  is  evidence  of  what  may  be  asserted  as  a 
fact,  that  McDowell  placed  confidence  in  Tyler 
and  tfea.ted  him  with  profound  respect.  It  hap- 


BULL    RUN   CAMPAIGN,  1861.  13 

pened  that  in  two  instances  during  the  cam 
paign,  Tyler's  official  action  met  with  McDow 
ell's  disapproval.  The  first  was  in  relation  to 
the  engagement  which  Tyler  brought  on  at 
Mitchell's  and  Blackburn's  fords,  July  18  ; 
and  the  second  was  the  delay  which  occurred 
in  Tyler's  advance  in  the  early  morning  of 
July  21.  McDowell's  official  expressions  con 
cerning  these  occurrences,  though  not  severe, 
created  a  bitterness  towards  him,  on  Tyler's 
part,  which ,  though  occasionally  breaking  out, 
found  full  vent  only  through  the  agency  of  his 
friends  after  his  death,  which  occurred  Novem 
ber  30,  1882. 


Tyler  opens  his  account  of  the  first  Bull  Run 
by  saying :  u  The  first  campaign  of  the  War  of 
the  Rebellion,  was  gotten~np  by  Gen.  McDow 
ell  and  his  friends,  and  was  intended  to  make 
him  the  hero  of  a  short  war  and  of  a  campaign 
begun  and  ended  in  the  first  battle  of  Bull 
Run.  All  the  accounts  of  that  battle  thus  far 
intended  for  history — I  refer  to  Mcolay's  and 
Prince  de  Joinville's" — (does  he  mean  Comte  de 
Paris?) — "were  either  written  or  inspired  by 
General  McDowell  and  his  friends,  intending, 
so  far  as  possible,  to  shield  his  military  reputa 
tion  from  the  condemnation  it  so  richly  de 
serves."  It  is  not  necessary  to  comment  upon 


14  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 

this  extravagant  assertion  further  than  to  say 
that,  if  true,  the  man  must  have  great  merits 
who  can  command  so  many  and  such  able  friends 
and  historians.  Tyler  continues  :  "McDowell 
has  been  an  expensive  ornament  to  the  military 
service  ;  and  his  courtier-like  services  in  the 
salon  have  immeasurably  exceeded  his  military 
services  in  the  field.  Commencing  at  the  head 
of  the  army  on  the  breaking  out  of  the  late  war, 
at  the  end  he  stood  at  the  foot  of  the  list— in 
the  estimation  of  the  army  and  the  public." 
This,  no  doubt,  is  a  specimen  of  Tyler' s  writing 
to  which  the  editor  of  his  memorial  volume 
refers  as  having  Tyler's  "  impassioned  ring." 
The  right  name  for  it  is  slander.  Having  re 
lieved  himself  of  this  spiteful  tirade  against  a 
distinguished  officer,  who  was  promoted  to  the 
grade  of  Major-General  long  after  the  war  was 
over  and  the  claims  of  its  leaders  had  been 
carefully  weighed  by  the  government  and  the 
people,  Tyler,  with  characteristic  inconsistency, 
closes  this  personal  abuse  by  saying  :  "  In  my 
account  of  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  I  shall  only 
state  what  was  personal  to  myself  or  the  troops 
under  my  command."  In  other  words,  having 
said  the  worst  I  can  of  the  man  I  hate,  I  shall 
now  proceed  to  be  just,  and  shall  speak  only 
of  what  is  personal  to  myself  and  my  com 
mand. 
The  assertion  that  the  Bull  Run  Campaign 


BULL    RUN    CAMPAIGN,  1861.  15 

"  was  gotten  up  by  General  McDowell  and  his 
friends,"  is  true  only  in  the  sense  that  the peo 
pie  of  the  North  are  the  friends  referred  to.  In 
a  more  restricted  sense,  it  would  show  that 
Tyler  misunderstood  or  misrepresented  the  sen 
timent  of  the  time.  To  suppose  that  a  young 
general,  without  military  prestige,  without  po 
litical  antecedents — having  never  even  voted  or 
attended  a  political  meeting,  never  written  or 
made  a  speech  on  a  political  question  in  his  life 
—unknown  to  the  country,  unacquainted  even 
with  the  President  or  any  of  his  cabinet  before 
the  commencement  of  the  war,  should  have 
stirred  up  the  public  press,  inflamed  the  pub 
lic  mind  to  force  the  government  to  order 
an  advance  into  Virginia,  is  to  give  an  insig 
nificant  source  to  a  great  movement.  Mc 
Dowell  had  no  such  commanding  power  as  to 
have  a  campaign  set  on  foot  for  his  special 
benefit.  He  was  simply  an  instrument  used 
for  purposes  which  had  their  origin  quite  out 
of  his  sphere  and  beyond  the  reach  of  his  mod 
erate  influence.  This  campaign  resulted  logi 
cally  from  acts  in  the  history  of  the  country 
which  can  be  attributed  to  no  one  person,  to  no 
one  party.  It  was  the  resultant  of  great  politi 
cal  and  social  forces  which  had — many  of  them 
—moved  the  nation  years  before  the  outbreak 
of  the  rebellion. 
'  There  was  an  unmistakable  public  demand 


16  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 

for  the  advance  upon  Manassas  in  July,  1861. 
Even  General  Scott,  who  held  out  against  it  for 
a  time,  was  at  last  forced  to  yield.  Nothing 
but  blindness  or  malice  can  explain  the  charge 
that  the  campaign  was  gotten  up  by  McDowell 
and  his  friends  for  the  purpose  of  making  a 
hero  of  him.  The  assertion  is  unjust  to  the 
Northern  masses,  who,  impatient  under  the 
wickedness  and  insolence  of  the  outbreak,  de 
manded  an  immediate  clash  of  arms  in  vindica 
tion  of  outraged  loyalty/  The  responsibility 
for  publishing  such  a  charge  rests  with  Tyler's 
biographers. 

THE   ADVANCE. 

Tyler  says : 

"  In  the  order  directing  the  movement  of  the 
army  I  was  instructed  to  concentrate  my  com 
mand  at  or  near  Vienna  on  the  night  of  the 
15th."  * 

He  should  have  said  on  the  16th. 

This  mistake  as  to  date  is  not  a  slip  of  the  pen. 
It  is  carried  out  through  his  narrative.  He  says 
he  was  engaged  at  Blackburn's  Ford  the  17th  ; 
and  it  is  a  salient  point  in  his  narrative,  dis 
cussed  further  on,  that  "it  was  the  delay  of 
three  days  succeeding  the  affair  at  Blackburn' s 
Ford  that  lost  the  battle  of  Bull  Run."  To 
get  these  three  days,  he  counted  back  from 
the  well-known  21st  of  July,  and  made  the 


BULL    RUN   CAMPAIGN,  1861.  17 

affair  at  Blackburn' s  Ford  come  off  on  the  17th, 
instead  of  the  18th, 

This  error  of  dates  is  of  no  other  conse 
quence,  in  the  present  connection,  than  to  give 
one  of  several  instances  of  Tyler's  defective 
memory  in  dealing  with  questions  of  the  cam 
paign. 

Another  is  found  in  his  statement  of  the 
orders  under  which  he  marched  from  Vienna. 
On  this  point  his  latest  statement  is  that 
he  was  "to  move  at  early  dawn  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Centre vill  e,  ma  Flint  Hill  School- 
house."  In  his  testimony  in  1862  (Committee 
on  Conduct  of  the  War,  pp.  198-199),  he  says  : 
uMy  line  of  march  was  by  Vienna  to  Flint 
Hill,  and  from  thence  I  had  authority  from 
General  McDowell  to  take  either  route  by  Fair 
fax  Court-house,  or  the  route  by  Germantown, 
as  my  judgment  should  indicate." 

The  order  given  him  will  be  found  on  page 
304,  Rebellion  Records.  It  is  as  follows  : 

1.  u  Brigadier- General  Tyler  will  direct  his 
march  so  as  to  intercept  the  enemy's  communi 
cation  between  Fairfax  Court-house  and  Cen- 
treville,  moving  to  the  right  or  left  of  German- 
town,  as  he  may  find  most  practicable. 

"On  reaching  Centreville  turnpike  he  will 
direct  the  march  of  his  leading  brigade  either 
upon  Centreville  or  Fairfax  Court-house  as  the 
indication  of  the  enemy  may  require.  The 


18  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 

Second  Brigade  will  move  on  the  road  in  the 
direction  not  taken  by  the  First.  The  rear 
brigades  will  be  disposed  of  by  the  Division 
Commander  as  circumstances  may  require. 

"  Should  he  deem  it  best  a  brigade  may  be 
senfc  on  Fairfax  Court-house  direct  from  Flint 


It  will  be  noticed  that  he  was  to  direct  his 
march  so  as  "to  intercept  the  enemy*  s  com 
munication"  between  Fairfax  Court-house  and 
Centreville.  To  do  this  he  was  to  go  either  to 
the  right  or  left  of  Germantown  —  not  to  Fair 
fax  Court-house  —  as  he  might  see  fit. 

The  discretionary  authority  for  him  to  send 
one  of  the  rear  brigades  direct  on  Fairfax 
Court-house  from  Flint  Hill  has  been  converted 
in  his  mind  into  authority  for  him  to  go  there 
himself  —  which  would  have  been  inconsistent 
with  the  object  of  his  movement,  to  intercept 
the  enemy  s  communication  between  the  Court 
house  and  Centreville.  He  omits  all  reference 
to  this  prime  object  of  his  march,  and  it  may 
be  added,  he  failed  to  accomplish  it,  and  has 
never  in  his  reports  or  letters  explained  this 
failure. 

Apparently  not  appreciating  the  importance 
of  the  part  assigned  him,  Tyler  says  : 

"  I  moved  quietly  on  towards  Centreville, 
arriving  in  sight  of  that  place  about  four 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon." 


BULL   RUN   CAMPAIGN,  1861.  19 

The  enemy,  too,  bears  witness  to  the  quiet 
ness  of  the  movement.  Captain  Del-Kemper, 
commanding  their  rearguard,  says  (p.  439,  Re 
bellion  Records):  "The  enemy  seemed  not 
disposed  to  press  us  closely,  and  we  reached 
Centreville  without  incident  worthy  of  note 
about  12  M.,"  and  General  Bonham  says  (p. 
450,  Rebellion  Records):  "The  column  thus 
fell  back  in  perfect  order  to  Centreville.  The 
enemy  not  venturing  to  attack  my  rear 
guard." 

In  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  Tyler,  speaking  of 
his  march  from  Vienna,  says  : 

u  We  continued  our  march  until  about  four 
o'clock  in  the  evening,  and  then  bivouacked 
for  the  night.  I  think  that  was  the  first  mis 
fortune  of  our  movement.  I  think,  if  we  had 
gone  on  to  Centreville  that  night,  we  should 
have  been  in  much  better  condition  the  next 
day." 

This  failure  to  go  to  Centreville  was  not  the 
first  misfortune  of  our  movement.  An  earlier 
one,  just  pointed  out,  was  Tyler's  quiet  march 
and  failure  to  intercept  the  enemy's  communi 
cation. 

Tyler  says  he  was  ordered  by  McDowell  to 
halt  and  bivouac  between  Germantown  and 
Centreville.  But  he  omits  to  say  that  Tie  had 
reported  to  McDowell  that  his  troops  could  go 


20 


MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 


no  further.  McDowell  reported  this  fact  at  the 
time  (July  17)  to  Army  Headquarters  (see  p. 
305,  Rebellion  Records).  He  there  stated  to 
General  Scott—"  I "  (McDowell)  "  endeavored 
to  pursue  beyond  Centreville,  but  the  men 
were  too  much  exhausted  to  do  so." 

Whatever  there  was  of  misfortune  in  our  not 
going  to  Centreville  that  night  was  due  mainly 
to  Tyler's  representations  of  the  condition  of 
his  troops. 


BULL    BUN    CAMPAIGN,  1861.  21 

BLACKBURN'S  FOED. 

Tyler  says  : 

"On  the  night  of  the  16th  [17th]  a  small 
movement  of  troops  could  be  seen  at  Centre- 
ville  ;  but  nothing,  in  my  opinion  intimating 
that  there  was  to  be  any  great  resistance  at 
that  point,  and  at  daybreak  on  the  morning  of 
the  17fch  [18th]  it  appeared  to  me  that  Centre- 
ville  had  been  abandoned  by  the  rebel  troops, 
which  was  found  to  be  the  case,  for  Schenck's 
brigade  leading,  marched  that  morning  into 
Centreville  and  occupied  it  without  tiring  of  a 
gun." 

According  to  both  Tyler's  own  report  (p.  310, 
Rebellion  Records)  and  Richardson's  testi 
mony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  W ar,  p.  19,  it  was  not  Schenck's,  but  Rich 
ardson's,  brigade  that  led  the  march  into  Cen 
treville.  Tyler  says:  "  My  division  moved 
from  its  encampment  at  7  A.M.  At  9  A.M. 
Richardson's  brigade  reached  Centreville  and 
found  that  the  enemy  had  retreated  the  night 
before."  * 

Richardson  says  :     *    *     "  then  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  18th  my  brigade  took  the  lead." 
***** 

Tyler  continues  his  narrative,  saying  : 
u  I  reported  the  condition  of  things  to  Gen. 
McDowell  about  7  A.M.,  and  asked  for  instruc- 


22  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 

tions  ;  but  up  to  11  o'clock  A.M.  I  heard  noth 
ing  from  the  commander  of  the  army." 

On  p.  312,  Rebellion  Records,  will  be  found 
a  copy  of  the  order  given  Tyler,  in  writing,  the 
morning  of  the  18th.  It  is  as  follows  : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  NORTH 
EASTERN  VIRGINIA. 

"Between  Germantown  and  Centremlle, 

"  July  18,  1861.     8.15A.M. 
"  GENERAL : 

"I  have  information  which  leads  me  to  be 
lieve  you  will  find  no  force  at  Centreville,  and 
will  meet  with  no  resistance  in  getting  there. 

"  Observe  well  the  roads  to  Bull  Run  and  to 
Warrenton.  Do  not  bring  on  an  engagement, 
but  keep  up  the  impression  that  we  are  moving 
on  Manassas. 

'•  1  go  to  Heintzleman' s  to  arrange  about  the 
plan  we  have  talked  over. 

"  Very  respectfully,  &c., 

"IRVIN  MCDOWELL, 

"Brigadier  General. 
"  Brigadier  General  Tyler" 

The  receipt  of  this  order  is  not  denied.  It 
was  carried  to  Tyler  by  McDowell' s  senior  aid- 
de-camp,  Major — afterwards  General — Wads- 
worth  (see  pp.  46-47,  "Report  of  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War").  McDowell's 


BULL    RUN   CAMPAIGN,  1861.  23 

headquarters,  when  that  order  was  written, 
were  not  far  from  Tyler's,  both  being  between 
Germantown  and  Centreville.  It  is  hardly 
possible  he  did  not  receive  it  before  eleven 
o'clock. 

The  route  over  which  Tyler  moved  on  the 
18th  of  July,  was  the  direct  road  from  Centre 
ville  to  Manassas  Junction.  That  road  crossed 
Bull  Run  at  MitclieW s  Ford — not  Blackburn's 
Foil— though  a  road  branching  off  to  Tyler's 
left  crossed  the  Eun  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  a 
short  distance  below  Mitchell's  Ford,  and  led 
on  thence,  though  not  so  directly,  to  Manassas 
Junction. 

Tyler's  attack  covered  both  fords,  but  his 
artillery  was  directed  mainly  against  Mitchell's 
Ford.  These  fords  were  in  supporting  distance 
of  each  other,  and  the  passage  of  either  could 
be  effected  only  by  overcoming  all  the  resist 
ance  at  both  as  well  as  the  reserve  in  their  rear. 
The  article  in  the  "Post "  says  :  "  No  one  can 
arise  from  the  perusal  of  Tyler's  account  with 
out  feeling  satisfied  that  the  great  blunder  of 
that  unfortunate  campaign  was,  the  almost 
unaccountable  failure  of  McDowell  to  allow 
Gen.  Tyler  immediately  to  follow  up  the  affair 
at  Blackburn's  Ford  as  the  latter  desired." 

Immediately  after  writing  the  order  of  8.15 
A.M.  to  Tyler,  McDowell  went  to  the  extreme 
left  for  the  purpose  alluded  to  in  the  note. 


24  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 

The  note  contains  all  the  orders  given  by  Mc 
Dowell  to  Tyler  on  the  18th,  till  after  the 
latter  had,  of  his  own  motion,  passed  through 
Centre ville  and  gone  down  to  Bull  Run,  brought 
on  an  engagement  and  been  repulsed.  That  af 
fair,  from  beginning  to  end,  was  Tyler's,  brought 
on,  continued  and  ended  by  him  in  McDowell's 
absence  ;  and  all  of  Tyler's  acts  in  relation  to 
it,  were  either  against  McDowell's  orders  or 
without  his  knowledge.  The  claim  that  Tyler 
desired  to  follow  up  the  affair  at  Blackburn's 
Ford,  but  was  not  allowed  by  McDowell  to  do 
so,  is  without  foundation.  Tyler's  report  (p. 
311)  written  (July  27,  '61),  shortly  after  the 
affair,  when  the  facts  were  fresh  in  his  mem 
ory,  refutes  the  claim  and  shows  that  lie  or 
dered  the  withdrawal,  and  that  he  had  no 
desire  to  follow  up  the  affair.  On  the  contrary, 
it  shows  a  purpose  to  exculpate  himself  for 
having  made  the  attack,  and  to  throw  the 
responsibility  on  his  brigade  commander,  Rich 
ardson.  He  says  :  u  The  moment  Ayres  opened 
his  fire,  the  enemy  replied  with  volleys  which 
showed  that  the  whole  bottom  was  filled  with 
troops,  and  that  he  had  batteries  established 
in  different  positions  to  sweep  the  approaches." 
*  #  «  This  attack  on  Captain  Ayres  accom 
plished  the  object  I  desired,  as  it  showed  that 
the  enemy  was  in  force  and  disclosed  the  posi 
tion  of  his  batteries  ;  and  Jiad  I  been  at  hand  tlie 


BULL   RUN   CAMPAIGN,  1861.  25 

movement  would  have  ended  here"  *  *  "  Hav 
ing  satisfied  myself  that  the  enemy  was  in 
force  and  also  as  to  the  position  of  his  batteries, 
/  ordered  Colonel  Richardson  to  witJidraw  It  Is 
brigade."  *  *  That  is  Tyler's  official  state 
ment  made  at  the  time,  of  his  object  in  going  to 
Blackburn's  Ford,  of  what  he  found  there,  of 
his  withdrawal,  and  of  his  reasons  for  with 
drawing.  His  sole  and  entire  responsibility  is 
fully  confessed  in  his  testimony,  1862,  before 
Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War,  pages  199, 
200.  He  says:  "  As  soon  as  /found  out  the 
condition  of  things  7  sent  back  for  Ayres'  bat 
tery  *  *  and  had  it  brought  and  put  into 
position  7  then  took  Richardson's 

brigade  and  filed  it  down  there  to  see  what  there 
was  in  the  bottom.  *  *  I  sent  some  skir 
mishers  into  the  woods.  *  *  7  saw  an  open 
ing  where  we  could  have  a  chance  to  get  in  a 
couple  of  pieces  of  artillery,  and  /ordered  Cap 
tain  Ayres"  *  *  The  substance  of  Tyler's 
own  report  and  testimony  is  that  lie  directed 
everything.  The  conclusion  from  all  the  facts 
is  unavoidable— that  it  was  Beauregard,  not 
McDowell,  who  prevented  him  from  going  on. 
Richardson  says  (p.  313),  after  the  disastrous 
repulse  of  the  12th  N.  Y.  Volunteers  :  UI  now 
reported  to  General  Tyler,  and  proposed  to  him 
to  make  a  charge  with  the  three  remaining 
regiments  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  the 


26  MCDOWELL   AND    TYLER. 

enemy' s  position.  The  General  replied  that  the 
enemy  were  in  large  force  and  strongly  fortified, 
and  a  further  attack  was  unnecessary."  In 
addition  to  the  foregoing  official  reports,  Tyler 
made  a  sworn  statement  on  this  subject.  In  his 
testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct 
of  the  War  (p.  200),  given  January  20,  1862,  he 
says  further:  ' 4 1  ordered  Captain  Ayres  to  take  a 
couple  of  howitzers  and  go  into  that  opening 
and  throw  some  canister  shot  into  the  woods. 
The  very  moment  he  came  into  battery,  it  ap 
peared  to  me  that  there  were  five  thousand 
muskets  h'red  at  once.  It  appears  by  Beaure- 
gard's  report  he  had  seventeen  regiments  in 
front  there.  Having  satisfied  myself  that  the 
enemy  was  in  force  and  also  as  to  the  position  of 
his  batteries,  /  ordered  Colonel  Richardson  to 
withdraw  his  brigade,  which  was  skillfully, 
though  unwillingly  accomplished." 

And  now,  some  twenty  years  after  these  oc 
currences,  and  in  the  face  of  his  own  testimony 
and  official  reports,  Tyler,  apparently  having 
learned  nothing  and  forgotten  much  of  what  he 
knew  concerning  them,  says  (p.  54,  Memoirs) : 
"  From  what  I  knew  then  and  ascertained 
afterwards,  I  think  my  four  brigades  could 
have  whipped  Beauregard  before  sundown." 
*  "When  the  skirmish  commenced  at 
Blackburn's  Ford,  Beauregard  was  surprised, 
and  at  that  time  he  could  not  before  sunset  have 


BULL   RUN   CAMPAIGN,  1861. 


concentrated  fifteen  hundred  men  on  the  field." 
Fortunately  he  gives  his  reason  for  this  extrav- 
gant  afterthought.  It  is,  that  '  <  the  entire  South 
Carolina  contingent  of  Beauregard's  army  was 
down  in  the  Occoquan  region;  its  mission  was  to 
protect  the  route  of  Fredericksburg,  and  it  was 
a  kind  of  independent  command  under  its  South 
Carolina  general,  and  not  within  striking  dis 
tance  for  a  battle  on  the  seventeenth"  (eight 
eenth  it  ought  to  be).  This  is  an  unaccount 
able  error.  It  shows  in  what  dense  ignorance 
of  the  campaign  Tyler  lived  and  died.  The 
Records  of  the  Rebellion,  Vol.  II.,  hereinbefore 
referred  to,  published  some  time  before  Tyler's 
death,  contain  the  reports  of  Generals  Beaure- 
gard,  Longstreet,  Bonham  and  their  subordin 
ates  (pp.  440  to  458).  They  prove  that  the  South 
Carolina  contingent,  which  Tyler  says  was  a 
kind  of  independent  command  under  its  South 
Carolina  general,  and  could  not  be  brought 
within  striking  distance,  was  actually  in  Ms 
immediate  front!—  that  the  2d,  3d,  7th  and  8th 
South  Carolina  regiments  under  Gen.  Bonham 
was  the  force  upon  which  Tyler's  artillery  com 
menced  the  attack.  The  other  South  Carolina 
regiment  was  in  D.  R.  Jones'  brigade  at  the 
next  ford,  a  short  distance  below.  "  The  South 
Carolina  contingent"  was  not  only  in  front  of 
Tyler  on  the  18th,  but  four  regiments  of  it  un 
der  Gen.  Bonham  had  been  in  his  immediate 


28  MCDOWELL   AND    TYLER. 

front  at  Fairfax  Court  House  when  the  latter 
was  at  Fall's  Church.  It  was  these  South 
Carolina  troops  Tyler  was  expected  to  intercept 
on  his  first  day's  march  ;  and,  strange  as  it  may 
appear  in  the  ligh  t  of  Tyler' s  latest  assertion  that 
"the  entire  South  Carolina  contingent  was 
down  in  the  Occoquan  region,"  lie  was  told  at 
the  time  he  arrived  at  Centreville  that  they 
were  in  his  front.  In  his  testimony  before  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  Janu 
ary  20,  1862,  p.  199,  Tyler  says:  "On  arriving 
at  Centreville  I  found  that  the  enemy  had 
evacuated  their  fortifications  and  that  Cox's 
division,  as  I  was  told  by  their  people,  had 
passed  over  Stonebridge,  and  Bonham,  with 
the  South  Carolina  and  Georgia  troops,  had 
passed  down  by  Blackburn's  Ford"  It  is 
not  necessary  to  pile  up  evidence  on  this  point. 
I  was  McDowell's  Adjutant-General  in  that 
campaign.  After  he  had  gone  to  the  left  of  his 
line  on  the  morning  of  the  18th,  I  went  to  the 
front  and  arrived  at  Tyler's  advanced  position, 
overlooking  Mitchell's  and  Blackburn's  Fords, 
just  before  he  sent  Ay  res  forward  into  the  skirt 
of  woods  along  the  Run.  Desiring  to  learn  all 
I  could  about  the  enemy,  I  accompanied  the 
cavalry  under  Brackett  which  went  as  support 
for  Ayres'  guns.  When  the  enemy  opened 
upon  us  it  seemed  to  me,  as  it  did  to  Tyler, 
that  "there  were  five  thousand  muskets  fired 


BULL   BUN   CAMPAIGN,  1861.  29 

at  once."  Ayres  saw  instantly  that  his  com 
mand  could  not  exist  long  in  such  musketry 
fire,  and  without  waiting  for  orders  he  promptly 
limbered  up;  and  Brackett,who  had  dismounted 
his  men,  remounted  them  and  all  went  at  full 
speed  across  the  open  bottom-land  to  the  high 
ground  in  rear  whence  Ty]er  had  sent  them.  I 
am  quite  certain  that  no  one  present  thought  at 
the  time  that  Beauregard  could  not  concentrate 
1,500  men,  that  Tyler  with  his  four  brigades 
could  whip  him  before  sundown,  or  even  that 
all  of  McDowell's  army,  if  concentrated  for  the 
effort,  could  go  to  Manassas  junction  by  way  of 
Mitchell's  and  Blackburn's  Fords. 

Foreseeing  the  bad  effect  Tyler's  repulse 
would  have  upon  the  troops,  and  wishing  to 
avert  the  depression  which  he  knew  would  fol 
low  from  Tyler's  having  been  driven  back,  Mc 
Dowell,  when  he  learned  of  the  affair  after  it  was 
all  over,  gave  Tyler  verbal  orders  to  reoccupy 
the  high  ground  where  his  command  had  been 
engaged.  But  Tyler, from  misunderstanding  the 
orders,  or  from  lack  of  disposition  to  do  any 
thing  more  there,  did  not  carry  out  the  verbal 
orders,  and  just  after  midnight  (18th-19th) 
McDowell  gave  him  written  orders  as  follows 
(p.  306,  Records  of  the  Rebellion) : 


30  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLEE. 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  ETC., 
"  Centrevitte, 

"July  19,  1861.     12.30  A.M. 
"BRIGADIER-GENERAL  TYLER, 

Commanding  1st  Division: 
"There  seems  to  be  a  misunderstanding  on 
your  part  of  the  order  issued  for  a  brigade  of 
your  division  to  be  posted  in  observation  on 
the  road  leading  to  the  place  where  your  com 
mand  was  engaged  yesterday,  July  18.  It  was 
intended  that  the  movement  should  have  been 
made  long  before  this.  The  train  of  subsistence 
came  up  long  ago.  I  have  given  no  order  or  in 
struction  of  a  change  in  this  matter.  I  thought 
that  the  brigade  was  posted  as  desired  until 
just  now,  when  Major  Brown,  who  is  just  re 
turned  from  your  headquarters,  informs  me 
that  no  action  under  these  orders  has  been 
taken.  Give  orders  which  will  cause  the  brig 
ade  to  be  there,  where  the  previous  instructions 
indicated,  by  dawn  this  morning. 

"  Very  respectfully, 

"IllVIN  MCDOWELL." 

As  to  Beauregard  having  been  surprised  by 
Tyler,  there  is  abundant  proof  to  the  contrary. 
He  was  kept  informed  of  what  passed  in 
Washington,  knew  of  our  advance,  knew  the 
organization  and  composition  of  McDowell's 
army,  etc.  In  his  report  of  August,  1861,  p. 


BULL   RUN   CAMPAIGN,  1861.  31 

440,  he  says:  " Opportunely  informed  of  the 
determination  of  the  enemy  to  advance  on 
Manassas,  my  advance  brigades,  on  the  night 
of  the  1 6th  of  July,  were  made  aware  of  the 
impending  movement."  In  his  report  of  July 
17,  to  Jefferson  Davis,  he  says,  p.  339 :  "I 
have  fallen  back  on  the  line  of  Bull  Run,  and 
will  make  a  stand  at  MitcheW  s  Ford?"  His 
special  orders,  No.  100,  from  Manassas  Junc 
tion,  dated  July  8,  p.  447,  448,  show  the  steps 
he  took  ten  days  before  to  meet  the  very  at 
tack  by  which  Tyler  claims  he  was  surprised. 
Beauregard's  report,  p.  440,  says,  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  18th  of  July  (the  day  when  Tyler 
attacked  Mitchell's  and  Blackburn's  Fords): 
"  My  troops  resting  on  Bull  Run,  from  Stone 
Bridge  to  Union  Mills,  a  distance  of  about 
eight  miles,  were  posted  as  follows,"  and  he 
proceeds  to  specify  the  forces  of  artillery,  in 
fantry  and  cavalry,  stationed  at  six  of  the 
crossings  of  the  stream,  and  the  reserves  held 
to  support  the  troops  at  Mitchell's,  Black 
burn'  s  and  McLean' s  fords,  which  a  bend  in 
the  river  enabled  him  to  place  about  equidis 
tant  from  all.  His  own  headquarters  were  near 
the  Reserve.  He  says  further:  "  On  the 
morning  of  the  18th,  finding  the  enemy  was  as 
suming  a  threatening  attitude,  in  addition  to 
the  regiments  whose  positions  have  already 
been  stated,  I  ordered  up  from  Gamp  Pickens, 


MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 


as  a  reserve  in  rear  of  Bonham,  the  effective 
men  of  six  companies  of  Kelly's  8th  Louisiana 
Volunteers,  and  Kirkland's  llth  North  Caro 
lina  Volunteers,  which  having  arrived  the  night 
before  en  route  for  Winchester,  I  had  halted 
in  view  of  the  existing  necessities  of  the  ser 
vice."  The  foregoing  extracts  show  that  Beau- 
regard  knew  when  and  by  what  routes  we  were 
coming  ;  that  to  meet  us,  he  had  posted  his 
whole  army  behind  Bull  Eun,  his  Reserves 
and  his  own  headquarters  near  the  places 
which  Tyler  attacked.  Yet  years  after  comes 
a  statement  from  Tyler,  that  at  that  time 
Beauregard  could  not,  before  sunset,  have 
concentrated  fifteen  hundred  men  on  the  field, 
that  he  had  surprised  him,  and  that  he  with 
his  four  brigades  could  have  whipped  Beaure 
gard  before  sundown.  Tyler's  command  con 
sisted  of  four  brigades  —  fifteen  regiments  of 
infantry,  four  batteries  of  artillery  —  some  of 
the  guns  of  heavy  caliber,  and  many  of  them 
rifled,  and  a  squadron  of  cavalry  —  an  effective 
force  for  duty  of  over  10,000  men  —  an  army 
in  itself.  It  will  be  noticed  in  McDowell's 
order  of  the  18th,  to  Tyler,  heretofore  quoted, 
he  says:  UI  go  to  Heintzleman's  to  arrange 
about  the  plan  of  moving  against  the  enemy's 
right,"  which  plan  as  the  note  says,  he  had 
talked  over  with  Tyler.  If  that  plan  had  been 
acted  upon  by  McDowell,  as  Tyler  supposed  it 


BULL   RUN   CAMPAIGN,  1861.  33 

would  be,  Tyler  could  no  longer  have  been  in 
the  advance.  But  being  in  advance  at  the 
time,  and  the  nearest  to  Manassas,  he  appears 
to  have  resolved,  practically,  to  take  the  di 
rection  of  the  campaign  into  his  own  hands. 
So  he  moved  against  Longstreet  at  Black- 


EEBATA. 

Page  33 :  Eighth  line  from  top,  for  North  Carol] 
read  South  Carolina. 


tnoughts.  Out  of  reach  of  his  commanding 
officer,  he  found  as  he  claims,  a  state  of  things 
which  warranted  him  in  assuming  the  respon 
sibility  of  a  different  course  from  the  one  or 
dered.  He  had  all  the  advantages  of  position— 
a  commanding  bank  on  his  side,  skirted  with 
timber  and  having  open  ground  beyond.  He 
says  that  the  enemy  was  surprised,  could  not 
have  concentrated  fifteen  hundred  men  on  the 
field  before  sunset,  and  that  he  could  have 
whipped  the  whole  of  Beauregard's  army  be 
fore  sundown.  Then,  in  the  name  of  every 
thing  that  is  soldierly,  why  did  he  not  do  it  ? 
According  to  his  own  account  he  had  the  whole 
field  to  himself.  No  superior  authority  near. 


32  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 

as  a  reserve  in  rear  of  Bonham,  the  effective 
men  of  six  companies  of  Kelly's  8th  Louisiana 
Volunteers,  and  Kirkland's  llth  North  Caro 
lina  Volunteers,  which  having  arrived  the  night 
before  en  route  for  Winchester,  I  had  halted 
in  view  of  the  existing  necessities  of  the  ser 
vice  "  mr  "  .  ,  ,  ,  .  „ 

rega 
com 
who 
and 
whi< 
a  si 
Bea 
con< 

that  ne  naci  surprised  mm,  ana  tnar  ne  witn 
his  four  brigades  could  have  whipped  Beaure- 
gard  before  sundown.  Tyler's  command  con 
sisted  of  four  brigades — iifteen  regiments  of 
infantry,  four  batteries  of  artillery — some  of 
the  guns  of  heavy  caliber,  and  many  of  them 
rifled,  and  a  squadron  of  cavalry — an  effective 
force  for  duty  of  over  10,000  men — an  army 
in  itself.  It  will  be  noticed  in  McDowell's 
order  of  the  18th,  to  Tyler,  heretofore  quoted, 
he  says:  "I  go  to  Heintzleman's  to  arrange 
about  the  plan  of  moving  against  the  enemy's 
right,"  which  plan  as  the  note  says,  he  had 
talked  over  with  Tyler.  If  that  plan  had  been 
acted  upon  by  McDowell,  as  Tyler  supposed  it 


BULL   RUN   CAMPAIGN,  1861.  33 

would  be,  Tyler  could  no  longer  have  been  in 
the  advance.  But  being  in  advance  at  the 
time,  and  the  nearest  to  Manassas,  he  appears 
to  have  resolved,  practically,  to  take  the  di 
rection  of  the  campaign  into  his  own  hands. 
So  he  moved  against  Longs treet  at  Black 
burn's  Ford,  and  what  he  forgot,  against  Bon- 
ham  and  the  North  Carolina  troops  at  Mitchell's 
Ford. 

Having  refuted  Tyler's  claims  concerning 
facts  and  circumstances  attending  his  a.ttack 
on  the  18th,  let  us  see  how  he  would  appear 
if  the  case  had  been  as  he  states  it  in  his 
memoirs,  and  whether  it  is  not  doing  him  a 
kindness  to  prove  the  error  of  his  after 
thoughts.  Out  of  reach  of  his  commanding 
officer,  he  found  as  he  claims,  a  state  of  things 
which  warranted  him  in  assuming  the  respon 
sibility  of  a  different  course  from  the  one  or 
dered.  He  had  all  the  advantages  of  position— 
a  commanding  bank  on  his  side,  skirted  with 
timber  and  having  open  ground  beyond.  He 
says  that  the  enemy  was  surprised,  could  not 
have  concentrated  fifteen  hundred  men  on  the 
field  before  sunset,  and  that  he  could  have 
whipped  the  whole  of  Beauregard's  army  be 
fore  sundown.  Then,  in  the  name  of  every 
thing  that  is  soldierly,  why  did  he  not  do  it  ? 
According  to  his  own  account  he  had  the  whole 
field  to  himself.  No  superior  authority  near. 


34  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 

He  had  incurred  the  responsibility  of  opening 
an  engagement  against  orders.  Yet  at  the 
head  of  some  ten  thousand  effective  men  of  all 
arms,  without  using  one-quarter  of  them,  he  al 
lowed  himself  to  be  repulsed,  defeated,  driven 
back,  leaving  his  dead  and  prisoners,  and  be 
tween  one  and  two  hundred  stand  of  arms  in 
the  hands  of  the  enemy  (p.  447).  McDowell, 
as  already  stated,  was  far  away,  knew  nothing 
of  the  affair,  and  did  not  reach  the  ground  un 
til  he  met  the  troops  returning  to  Centreville 
ridge  late  in  the  afternoon,  when  it  was  all 
over.  If  Tyler  attacked  at  all,  he  should  have 
done  so  in  force  and  held  his  ground,  and  thus 
enabled  McDowell  to  determine  whether  or 
not  to  follow  up  the  blow  with  the  whole 
army. 

The  truth  is,  there  was  a  surprise  at  Black 
burn's  Ford  on  the  18th  of  July,  1861,  but  it 
was  Tyler,  not  Beauregard,  who  was  surprised. 
Twenty  years  after,  in  the  bitterness  and 
blindness  of  ill-will  towards  his  Commanding 
General,  and  apparently  in  ignorance  of  what 
he  ought  to  have  known  and  what  he  might 
have  learned  from  the  records,  especially  his 
own  contributions  to  them,  if  he  did  not  know— 
his  friends  are  left  to  choose  between  admitting 
that,  in  his  own  judgment  and  against  orders, 
he  went  unwittingly  against  the  center  of  Beau- 
regard' s  entire  army  ;  or  that  with  a  fine  army 


BULL    RUN    CAMPAIGN,  1861.  35 

of  Ms  own,  he  submitted  to  a  defeat  at  the 
hands  of  part  of  the  enemy's  forces.  That  he 
was  defeated  is  certain. 

The  consequences  of  that  defeat  were  seri 
ous.  The  effect  was  plainly  seen.  The  feeling 
was  universal  that  things  had  gone  against  us. 
The  12th  New  York  Volunteers  were  paralyzed 
by  the  shock,  and  the  depressing  effect  of  the 
repulse  was  not  confined  to  them  ;  the  whole 
army  felt  it.  The  4th  Pennsylvania  Infantry, 
and  the  8th  New  York  battery,  their  terms 
having  expired,  went  home  as  the  battle  of  the 
21st  was  about  to  begin.  The  troops  began  the 
advance  from  the  Potomac,  with  a  dread  of 
being  sent  against  "masked  batteries."  They 
felt  that  their  fears  on  this  point  were  now  re- 
alizedj  and  they  were  so  in  fact,  for  they  had 
been  sent  against  "masked  batteries."  The 
possibility  of  making  a  front  attack  was  thus 
destroyed  by  Tyler  himself.  He  reported  soon 
after  the  affair  that  he  found  the  place  "was 
strongly  fortified,  and  the  enemy  in  large  force," 
p.  313.  McDowell  said  in  his  report,  p.  308  :  "  If 
it  were  needed,  the  experience  of  the  18th  in 
stant  shows  we  cannot,  with  this  description 
of  force,  attempt  to  carry  batteries  such  as  now 
before  us;"  and  Beauregard,  p.  447,  says: 
"  The  effect  of  this  day's  conflict  was  to  sat 
isfy  the  enemy  he  could  not  force  a  passage 
across  Bull  Run  in  the  face  of  our  troops,  and 


36  MCDOWELL   AND    TYLEK. 

led  him'  into  the  flank  movement  of  the  21st  of 
July,  and  the  battle  of  Manassas." 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  were  no  works  im 
mediately  at  Blackburrts  Ford.  The  belief  at 
the  time,  however,  was  that  it  was  strongly 
fortified,  as  Tyler  thought,  and  it  will  be  seen 
from  the  reports  of  General  Bonham's  officers 
that  the  adjoining  position  at  Mitchell's  Ford 
was  fortified,  and  had  been  for  some  time. 

The  purport  of  our  reports  and  reconnais 
sances  at  the  time  was  to  the  effect  that  of 
all  the  crossings  over  Bull  Run,  within  our 
reach,  including  the  Stone  Ridge— said  to  be 
mined — the  first  unfortified  one  was  the  Sud- 
ley  Spring  Ford,  where  we  crossed  July  21 
(p.  330,  Report  of  Barnard,  Chief  of  Engineers, 
of  McDowell's  army). 


THE   BATTLE   OF   BULL   KUIsT,    JULY    21,    1861. 

The  task  of  whipping  Beauregard's  army, 
which  Tyler,  in  the  face  of  his  failure,  boasts 
he  could  have  performed  with  four  brigades 
on  the  18th,  was  not  undertaken  by  McDowell 
until  the  21st,  and  then  he  was  defeated. 

The  Evening  Post,  quoting  Tyler,  says :  "  It 
was  the  delay  of  three  days  succeeding  the  af 
fair  at  Blackburn's  Ford  that  lost  the  battle  of 
Bull  Run  ;  and  for  what  purpose  this  delay 
occurred  no  proper  explanation  has  been  or 
can  be  made." 


BULL   KUN   CAMPAIGN,  1861.  37 

It  may  be  repeated  here  that  the  delay  was 
from  the  evening  of  the  18th  till  2  o'clock  on 
the  morning  of  the  21st — two  instead  of  three 
days.  When  before  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  January  20,  1862,  Tyler 
was  asked  what  "  caused  the  disaster  of 
that  day?"  July  21.  He,  under  oath  said, 
u  Want  of  discipline  and  instruction  in  the 
troops."  "  Were  there  any  other  more  proxi 
mate  causes  than  that  ?"  asked  the  Committee. 
Here  was  an  opportunity,  if  not  an  invitation, 
for  Tyler  to  assert  his  u three"  days'  delay  at 
Centre ville,  if  that  had  been  in  his  mind  as  a 
cause,  but  he  did  not  give  delay  as  a  cause ; 
on  the  contrary,  he  gave  as  the  "more  proxi 
mate1'  cause  "  want  of  instruction  and  pro 
fessional  knowledge  among  the  officers,  tlie 
company  and  regimental  officers"  During 
these  "  three"  days  Tyler  asserts  "  there  were 
no  movements  made  to  ascertain  the  force  or 
position  of  the  enemy,  and  the  army  had  its  full 
provision  of  seven  days  when  it  started  from 
Washington,  and  was  in  no  way  in  want  of  sup 
plies  of  any  kind." 

The  consequences  of  the  two  days'  delay  at 
Centreville,  the  causes  of  the  delay,  and  the 
responsibility  for  that  delay,  are  important  and 
independent  questions. 

Johnson's  army,  over  eight  thousand  strong, 


38  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 

joined  Beauregard  between  the  night  of  Thurs 
day,  the  18th,  and  the  evening  of  Sunday,  the 
21st.  His  leading  brigade  under  Jackson  arrived 
on  the  19th.  Bee's  brigade  and  Johnston  in 
person  arrived  on  the  20th,  and  the  remain 
der  reached  the  field  on  the  21st,  in  time  to 
take  part  in  the  action.  General  Scott,  who 
controlled  both  McDowell  and  Patterson,  was 
responsible  for  this  change  in  the  relative 
strength  of  the  contending  armies.  The  cam 
paign  he  required  McDowell  to  make  was 
based  upon  the  condition  that  Johnston  should 
not  join  Beauregard  without  having  Patterson 
on  his  heels.  McDowell  would  not  have  been 
justified  in  conducting  his  operations  upon  the 
assumption  that  the  condition  upon  which  the 
campaign  was  predicated  by  the  General-in- 
Chief,  was  going  to  be  violated.  Nor  did  he 
know,  until  the  21st,  during  the  battle,  though 
he  suspected  it,  that  Johnston's  forces  had 
joined  Beauregard.  It  must  be  admitted  that 
it  would  have  been  better  for  McDowell  if  he 
could  have  executed  on  the  19th  or  20th  the 
plan  of  battle  he  acted  upon  on  the  21st,  and 
still  better,  perhaps,  if  he  could  have  done  so 
before  Tyler's  fiasco  on  the  18th.  But  that 
was  not  possible.  Neither  the  preparation  of 
his  plan  nor  the  state  of  his  supplies  permitted 
it.  He  did  not  form  the  plan,  nor  did  he  have 
the  information  upon  which  to  base  it,  until 


BULL   RUN   CAMPAIGN,  1861.  39 

the  20th.  He  did  not  learn  until  the  night  of 
the  18th  that  the  enemy  was  going  to  defend 
the  line  of  Bull  Kun.  If  the  state  of  his  sup 
plies  had  permitted,  he  might  have  attempted 
to  force  that  line  by  a  direct  attack  on  the  19th 
or  20th,  as  Tyler  did  on  the  18th,  but  such  an 
enterprise  would  have  given  no  fair  promise, 
and  Tyler  destroyed  all  possibility  of  its  success 
by  his  disastrous  failure  on  the  18th.  Under 
all  the  circumstances  a  flank  movement,  instead 
of  a  direct  attack,  was  an  essential  part  of  any 
plan  which  might  be  adopted.  McDowell's 
first  intention  was  to  turn  the  enemy's  right, 
but  that  intention  had  to  be  abandoned  on 
the  18th.  ,  Tyler  says  that  between  the  18th 
and  21st,  "there  were  no  movements  made  to 
ascertain  the  force  or  position  of  the  enemy." 
Let  the  truth  of  what  was  done  speak  for 
itself.  In  his  report,  p.  330,  Barnard,  the  Ch'ief 
Engineer,  says:  'fc  At  my  interview  with  the 
Commanding  General  that  evening,  he  informed 
me  that  he  had  convinced  himself  that  the 
nature  of  the  country  to  the  left,  or  southard 
of  Manassas,  was  unfit  for  the  operations  of 
a  large  army.  I  told  him  I  would  endeavor 
the  next  day  to  obtain  such  information  as 
would  enable  him  to  decide  on  his  further 
movement."  No  one  deserves  censure  for  the 
time  which  was  consumed  in  obtaining  that 
information.  No  army  during  the  war  had 


40  MCDOWELL   AND    TYLER. 

such  an  array  of  military  engineering  latent  as 
McDowell  had  at  that  time.  Barnard  was  the 
Chief,  and  under  him  were  Woodbury,  Wright, 
B.  S.  Alexander,  A.  W.  Whipple,  Abbott, 
Putnam,  Prime,  Houston,  Snyder  and  O'Rorke, 
of  the  Engineer  Corps  of  the  regular  army. 
Their  ability  and  zeal  are  beyond  dispute. 
They  devoted  themselves  to  the  examinations 
and  reconnaissances  for  a  proper  plan  of  at 
tack.  In  seeking  a  route  to  the  right,  Barnard 
reports,  p.  830  :  "  I,  on  the  19th,  followed  up 
the  valley  of  Cub  Run,  until  we  reached  a 
point  west  of  10°  North,  and  about  four  miles 
in  an  air  line  from  Centreville,  near  which  we 
struck  a  road,  which  we  believed  to  lead  fco  the 
fords"  (near  Sudley  Springs).  "  Following  it 
for  a  short  distance,  we  encountered  the  ene 
my's  patrols.  As  we  were  most  anxious  to 
avoid  attracting  the  enemy's  attention  to  our 
designs  in  this  quarter,  we  did  not  care  to  pur 
sue  the  reconnaissance  farther.  We  had  seen 
enough  to  convince  us  of  the  perfect  practi 
cability  of  the  route.  To  make  more  certain  of 
the  fords,  however,  Captain  Woodbury  pro 
posed  to  return  at  night  (that  was  the  night 
of  19th),  and  with  a  few  Michigan  woodsmen 
from  Colonel  Sherman's  brigade,  to  endeavor 
to  find  them.  On  returning  to  camp  it  was 
determined  to  send  Captain  Wright  and  Lieut. 
Snyder,  engineers,  with  Captain  Woodbury. 


BULL    RUN   CAMPAIGN,    1861.  41 

At  the  same  time  the  Commanding  General 
directed  Captain  AVhipple,  Topographical  En 
gineer,  and  Lieut.  Prime,  engineer,  to  make  a 
night  reconnaissance  of  the  Run  between 
Warrenton  bridge  and  Blackburn's  Ford. 
Both  these  night  expeditions  failed.  It  was 
found  the  enemy  occupied  the  woods  too 
strongly  on  our  side  of  the  run  to  permit  the 
reconnaissances  to  be  accomplished.  It  was 
not  our  policy  to  drive  in  his  pickets  until  we 
were  in  motion  to  attack.  On  laying  before 
you  the  information  obtained,  the  Command 
ing  General  believed  himself  justified  in  adopt 
ing  the  following  plan  of  attack,  which  was 
decided  upon  on  tlie  20^,"  that  is,  after  the 
reconnaissances  of  the  night  of  the  19th. 

On  the  20th,  McDowell  issued  orders  for  the 
advance  to  begin  at  half -past  two  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  21st.  It  was  not  possible  for  him  to 
form  that  plan  or  act  upon  it  any  sooner  than 
he  did.  No  critic,  to  this  day,  I  believe,  not 
even  Tyler,  has  claimed  that  the  plan  was  not 
good.  What  the  result  would  have  been  of 
acting  earlier  upon  a  worse  plan,  no  one  can 
say  with  any  certainty. 

Tyler  says  :  "  The  army  had  its  full  provis 
ion  for  seven  days  when  it  started  from  Wash 
ington,  and  was  in  no  way  in  want  of  supplies 
of  any  kind"  on  the  18th.  The  Record  con 
tradicts  him.  The  troops  marched  from  the 


42  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 

Potomac  on  the  16th  with  tliree  days'  rations 
in  their  haversacks.  Wagons  were  to  follow 
the  next  day  containing  Jive  days'  rations,  but 
they  met  with  difficulties  and  delay.  Some  of 
them  arrived  in  time  to  distribute  supplies  to 
divisions  on  the  evening  of  the  18th,  others  not 
until  the  19th.  The  three  days'  rations  with 
which  the  troops  began  the  advance  on  the 
16th  ought  to  have  lasted  until  the  afternoon 
of  the  19th,  but,  on  account  of  the  inexperi 
ence  of  the  men,  they  were  exhausted  on  the 
18th.  The  reports  of  the  Chief  Commissary, 
Clarke  and  his  subordinates  explain  this  mat 
ter,  p.  336  to  344,  Rebellion  Records.  Lieut. 
Hawkins,  in  charge  of  one  of  the  three  supply 
trains,  says,  p.  343,  that  on  his  arrival  "  there 
was  immediate  necessity  for  the  distribution  of 
the  rations  ;  "  and  the  officer  in  charge  of  an 
other  of  the  trains,  Lieut.  Curtis,  p.  340,  says 
of  his  distribution  on  the  19th :  "I  found  the 
men  in  almost  a  starving  condition."  Heintzle- 
man  and  others  confirm  this,  and  Schenck's 
report,  (p.  360)  shows  that  his  brigade  of 
Tyler's  division  was  unfed  on  the  21st. 

An  advance  of  the  army  beyond  Centreville 
was  not  practicable  until  the  supply  trains 
came  up  and  their  contents  were  distributed. 
The  distribution  was  completed  to  divisions  on 
the  19th,  and  on  the  20th  McDowell  ordered,  p. 
325:  "The  commanders  of  divisions  will  give 


BULL   BUN   CAMPAIGN,    1861.  43 

the  necessary  orders  that  an  equal  distribution 
of  subsistence  stores  on  hand  be  made  immedi 
ately  to  the  different  companies  in  their  re 
spective  commands,  so  that  they  shall  be  pro 
vided  for  the  same  number  of  days,  and  that 
the  same  be  cooked  and  put  in  the  haversacks 
of  the  men.  The  subsistence  stores  now  in  the 
possession  of  each  division,  with  the  fresh  beef 
that  can  be  drawn  from  the  commissary,  must 
last  to  include  the  23d  instant." 

This  was  the  first  campaign  of  the  war.  The 
troops  were  not  soldiers,  but  civilians  in  uni 
form  ;  most  of  them  in  service  only  for  three 
months.  Giving  due  weight  to  all  the  circum 
stances,  there  was  no  culpable  delay  at  Centre- 
ville,  and  the  time  spent  there  between  the 
evening  of  the  18th  and  2  o'clock  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  21st,  was  necessary  to  replenish  the 
exhausted  haversacks  of  the  men  and  to  gain 
information  upon  which  to  form  a  proper  plan 
of  battle. 

The  enemy  was  strongly  posted  along  Bull 
Run,  his  right  at  Union  Mills,  and  his  left 
at  the  "  Stonebridge,"  where  the  Warrenton 
turnpike  crosses  the  stream.  His  line  was 
eight  miles  long.  Centreville,  around  which 
McDowell' s  army  was  concentrated,  was  nearly 
opposite  the  center  of  Beauregard's  line,  and 
only  about  three  or  four  miles  from  it. 


44  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 

There  was  no  misunderstanding  as  to  the 
plan  of  battle.  The  parts  of  the  different  di 
visions  were  clearly  set  forth  in  McDowell's 
general  order  No.  22  of  July  20,  p.  226,  and  ex 
planations  were  given  in  detail  at  a  conference 
on  the  evening  of  the  20th,  at  which  division  and 
brigade  commanders  were  present. 

After  explaining  the  situation  and  the  object 
to  be  accomplished,  the  order  says :  u  The  First 
Division  (General  Tyler),  with  the  exception  of 
Richardson's  brigade,  will  move  at  2.30  A.M. 
precisely,  on  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  to 
threaten  the  passage  of  the  bridge,  but  will  not 
open  fire  until  full  daybreak. 

"The  Second  Division  (Hunter's)  will  move 
from  its  camp  at  2  A.M.  precisely,  and  led  by 
Captain  Woodbury,  of  the  Engineers,  will,  after 
passing  Cub  Run,  turn  to  the  right  and  pass 
the  Bull  Run  stream  above  the  lower  ford  at 
Sudley  Springs,  and  then  turning  down  to  the 
left,  descend  the  stream  and  clear  away  the 
enemy  who  may  be  guarding  the  lower  ford  and 
bridge.  It  will  then  bear  off  to  the  right  to 
make  room  for  the  succeeding  division, 

"The  Third  Division  (Heintzleman' s)  will 
march  at  2.30  A.M.  and  follow  the  road  taken 
by  the  Second  Division  (Hunter's),  but  will 
cross  at  the  lower  ford  after  it  has  been  turned 
as  above,  and  then  going  to  the  left,  take  place 
between  the  stream  and  the  Second  Division. 


BULL    RUN    CAMPAIGN,    1861.  45 

"The  Fifth  Division  (Miles')  will  take  posi 
tion  on  the  Centreville  Heights  (Richardson's 
brigade  will,  for  the  time,  form  part  of  this  di 
vision  and  will  continue  in  its  present  position). 
One  brigade  will  be  in  the  village  and  one  near 
the  present  station  of  Richardson's  brigade. 
This  division  will  threaten  Blackburn' s  Ford, 
and  will  remain  in  reserve  at  Centreville. 

"  These  movements  may  lead  to  the  gravest 
results,  and  commanders  of  divisions  should 
bear  in  mind  the  immense  consequences  in 
volved." 

When  this  order  was  issued  Sherman's  and 
Schenck'  s  brigades  of  Tyler' s  division  were  in 
camp  in  advance  of  Centreville,  on  the  Warren- 
ton  turnpike, which  led  directly  to  the  enemy's 
left  at  the  Stone-Bridge,  about  two  and  a  half 
miles  away.  Keyes'  brigade  of  Tyler's  di 
vision  was  just  in  rear  of  Centreville,  a  mile 
behind  Sherman  ;  behind  him,  Hunter's  divis 
ion,  on  his  left,  Miles'  division,  and  in  rear 
of  Miles,  Heintzleman's  division.  It  was  only 
about  a  mile  from  the  camps  of  Sherman  and 
Schenck  to  the  point  where  Hunter  and 
Heintzleman  were  to  leave  the  turnpike  and 
take  the  country  road  to  the  right.  Order 
ing  Tyler,  who  occupied  the  turnpike  (over  a 
part  of  which  all  in  turn  had  to  move)  to  march 
at  "2.30  A.M.  precisely"  McDowell's  object 
was  to  have  him  clear  the  pike  as  far  as  the 


46  MCDOWELL   AND    TYLER. 

turn  off,  so  as  not  to  delay  Hunter  and  Heintzle- 
mann.  That  was  fully  understood  at  the  con 
ference  held  on  the  night  of  the  20th.  Tyler 
had  to  move  Sherman's  and  Schenck's  brigades 
one  mile  along  the  pike  to  accomplish  the  ob 
ject  of  opening  the  roads  to  the  following  divis 
ions.  Yet,  without  any  opposition  from  the 
enemy,  his  advance  was  so  slow  as  to  hold 
Hunter  and  Heintzleman  some  four  hours  on 
the  mile  or  two  of  the  turnpike  between  their 
camps  and  the  road  on  which  they  were  to 
turn  off  for  the  flank  march.  There  is  abund 
ant  proof  of  this  fact  in  the  official  reports 
printed  in  Records  of  the  Rebellion,  and  in  the 
testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Con 
duct  of  the  War,  and  the  Committee  itself  con- 
iirms  the  assertion  in  its  report  It  is  not 
necessary  to  cite  any  other  witness  than 
Tyler  himself.  While  not  frankly  admit 
ting  the  delay,  he  was  not  able  before  the 
Committee  to  deny  or  disprove  it.  He  said, 
p.  202 : 

Q.  "  Were  the  rest  of  the  divisions  delayed 
by  your  movement  ?'' 

A.  "They  were  not/ more  than  absolutely 
necessary,  under  the  circumstances." 

Q.    "What  time   did  your  movement  com 
mence  2" 

A.  "  At  half-past  two  o'clock/' 

Q.  "  You  were  to  advance,  how  f ar  2  " 


BULL    RUN    CAMPAIGN,    1861.  47 

A.  "To  the  Stone-Bridge,  about  two  and  a 
half  miles." 

Q.  u  At  what  time  did  the  portion  of  the 
division  under  your  command  reach  Stone- 
bridge?" 

A.  "It  reached  there  by  six  o'clock,  per 
haps  a  quarter  before  six." 

By  this  testimony  from  Tyler  himself,  he, 
with  no  opposition  from  the  enemy,  and  no 
obstruction  in  the  way,  was  about  three  hours 
and  a  half  marching  two  miles  and  a  half  over 
a  good  turnpike. 

The  Committee,  however,  went  a  little  fur 
ther,  and  asked,  pp.  202,  203  : 

Q.  "At  what  time  did  the  rear  of  your  di 
vision — I  do  not  mean  to  include  Keyes'  brig 
ade,  but  the  rear  of  that  which  was  with  you 
that  morning — pass  the  point  where  Hunter 
and  Heintzleman  turned  off  to  the  right  ? " 

A.   "  We  passed  there  before  four  o'clock." 

Q.   "Or  in  two  hours  after  you  started  ?  " 

A.  "Yes,  Sir!" 

The  point  from  which  the  part  of  his  division 
here  mentioned  (Sherman's  and  Schenck' s  brig 
ades)  marched,  and  the  point  where  Hunter  and 
Heintzleman  turned  off,  was  one  mile.  Tyler 
marched  that  distance  in  two  hours,  and  yet  he 
went  to  his  grave  with  a  grievance  because 
McDowell  said  in  his  report,  p.  318:  "There 
was  delay  in  the  First  Division  getting  out  of 


48  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 

its  camp  on  the  road,  and  the  other  divisions 
were,  in  consequence,  between  two  and  three 
hours  behind  the  time  appointed — a  great  mis 
fortune,  as  events  turned  out,"  and  because 
further,  that  in  his  testimony,  McDowell,  p. 
42,  refused  to  retract  this  part  of  his  report, 
and  said:  "General  Tyler  has  written  me  a 
letter  complaining  that  my  report  does  him  in 
justice,  and  asking  me  to  set  him  right  in  ref 
erence  to  this  matter  of  delay.  Under  the  cir 
cumstances,  I  did  not  feel  that  I  could  make 
any  change." 

In  view  of  Tyler's  abuse  and  criticism  of 
McDowell,  the  commander,  it  is  proper  to  look 
for  a  moment  at  the  part  played  in  that  battle 
by  Tyler  himself,  McDowell's  second  in  com 
mand,  as  well  as  his  critic.  He  says,  with  his 
division  alone,  he  could  have  whipped  Beaure- 
gard's  entire  army  before  sundown  on  the  18th, 
if  McDowell  had  not  prevented.  That  boast 
has  been  disposed  of.  Certainly  McDowell 
did  not  prevent  him  from  fighting  on  the 
21st.  What  help  did  he  give  toward  whip 
ping  Beauregard  on  that  day  ?  It  has  already 
been  shown  that  he  employed  the  three  and 
a  half  hours  between  2.30  and  6  A.M.  in 
marching  two  and  a  half  miles  to  the  vicinity 
of  the  Stone  bridge  on  the  Warren  ton  turn 
pike.  It  was  under  cover  of  the  demonstration 
he  was  to  make  at  that  point  that  Hunter  and 


BULL    RUN    CAMPAIGN,  1861. 


49 


Heintzelman  were  to  effect  their  flank  march 
and  turn  the  enemy's  left. 


POSITION   OF   TYLER    FROM     6   A.M.    UNTIL    ABOUT   12   M.    ON   21ST. 

The  rebel  position  at  Stone-Bridge  was  de 
fended  by  General  Evans.  Tyler's  report, 
written  six  days  after  the  battle,  when  every 
thing  was  comparatively  fresh  in  his  mind,  and 
when  he  was  not  making  an  attack  on  his 
commander  and  the  plan  of  battle,  says  (pp. 
348,  349,  Rebellion  Records) : 

"*  *  Soon  after  getting  into  position  we 
discovered  that  the  enemy  had  a  heavy  bat- 


50  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 

tery,  with  infantry  in  support,  commanding 
both  the  road  and  bridge  approaches,  on  which 
both  Ayres  and  Carlisle,  at  different  times,  tried 
the  effect  of  their  guns  without  success,  and  a 
careful  examination  of  the  banks  of  Bull-Run 
satisfying  me  that  they  were  impracticable  for 
purpose  of  artillery,  these  batteries  had  to  re 
main  comparatively  useless  until  such  time  as 
Hunter's  column  might  clear  the  approach  by 
a  movement  on  the  opposite  bank.  During 
this  period  of  waiting  the  80-pounder  was 
occasionally  used  with  considerable  effect 
against  bodies  of  infantry  and  cavalry,  which 
could  be  seen  from  time  to  time  moving  in  the 
direction  of  Hunter's  column  and  out  of  the 
range  of  ordinary  guns." 

Twenty  years  later  this  condition  of  affairs 
had  changed  in  Tyler's  mind.  In  his  mem 
oir,  traducing  McDowell,  he  says  : 

"  The  enemy  had  a  force  guarding  the  bridge, 
but  not  so  strong  that  a  passage  could  not  have 
been  forced  at  any  moment.  He  had  a  battery 
of  light  guns  there  in  the  early  part  of  the  day, 
but  they  were  soon  driven  off  by  Ayres'  battery 
and  the  heavy  eigh teen-pounder  gun  com 
manded  by  Lieutenant  Lyford." 

So  we  see  that  the  "  heavy '"  battery  and  sup 
ports  on  which,  according  to  Tyler,  in  1862. 
Ayres  and  Carlisle  fired  in  vain,  and  finally 
ceased  firing,  became  by  the  same  authority,  in 


BULL    RUN    CAMPAIGN,  1861.  51 

1881,  "  a  '  light'  battery,  which  was  soon  driven 
off  by  our  tire!"  and,  that,  the  waiting  for 
Hunter's  column  to  clear  the  opposite  bank 
was  not  necessary,  as  we  could  have  "forced 
the  passage  at  any  moment !  " 

In  this  instance  the  latest  statement  is  the 
correct  one.  The  truth  is  the  Stone-Bridge  was 
defended  by  a  fractional  brigade  consisting  of 
a  regiment  and  a  battalion  of  infantry,  a  squad 
ron  of  cavalry,  and  two  pieces  of  light  artil 
lery. 

Tyler's    demonstration  was   so    feeble    that 
Evans  was  not  long  deceived  by  it.     The  latter 
says  in  his  report,  p.  559  :  It  was  not  later  than 
eight  o'clock  "  when  I  perceived  that  it  was.  not 
the  intention  of  the  enemy  to  attack  me  in  my 
present  position,  but  had  commenced  his  move 
ment  to  turn  my  left  flank.  I  at  once  decided  to 
quit  my  position  and  to  meet  him  in  his  flank 
movement,    leaving    the    skirmishers    of    the 
Fpurth   Regiment   of    S.   C.  Volunteers,  sup 
ported  by  the  reserve  of  two  companies  to  keep 
him  engaged.     I  sent  word  to  Colonel  Phil.  St. 
George  Cocke  that  I  had  abandoned  my  posi 
tion  at  the  bridge  and  was  advancing  to  attack 
the  enemy  at  the  crossing  of  the  Warrenton 
turnpike   and  the  Manassas  road.     Observing 
carefully  the  movements  of  the  enemy, *  I  was 

*The  enemy  here  referred  to  is  Hunter's,  not  Tyler's  division. 


52  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 

able  to  form  my  line  of  attack  directly  in  his 
front,  covered  by  a  grove  of  woods,  by  9  o'clock 
a.  m."  It  thus  appears  that  the  division  which 
on  the  18th  could  have  whipped  Beauregard'  s 
aimy  before  sundown,  was  confronted  before  8 
a.  m.  on  the  21st  by  some  fifteen  companies  of 
infantry,  two  of  cavalry,  and  two  of  artillery, 
and  after  8  d 'clock  was  held  in  check  "  till  about 
noon"  — p  369 — by  the  skirmishers  of  the  4th 
S.  C.  Volunteers,  supported  by  two  companies 
of  that  regiment,  four  companies  in  all.  This, 
in  the  face  of  orders  to  Tyler  from  McDowell, 
the  delivery  of  which  is  proved  by  the  records, 
to  "  press  forward  the  attack"  and  in  the  face, 
too,  of  his  duty  in  the  matter,  as  admitted  in 
his  memoirs,  p.  57,  where  he  says,  that  when 
Hunter  and  Heintzelman  had  "attacked  and 
forced  the  enemy  to  the  vicinity  of  Stone 
Bridge, "  I  "  was  to  force  the  passage  of  Bull 
Run  at  that  point  and  attack  the  enemy  in 
flank."  It  does  not  appear,  nor  does  Tyler 
claim  that  he  did  press  the  attack  in  response  to 
McDowell's  orders.  In  fact  Tyler,  under  oath, 
denied,  but  subsequently  admitted,  that  he  had 
received  those  orders.  His  testimony  is  as  fol 
lows  :  January  20,  1 862,  before  the  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War — "  I  did  not  see 
General  McDowell  on  the  field,  and  I  did  not 
receive  any  order  from  him  during  that  day,  p. 
201.  *  *  * 


BULL   RUN   CAMPAIGN,    1861.  53 

' '  I  received  no  orders  from  General  McDowell 
after  I  left  him  Saturday  night,"  p.  203. 

"Question:  Did  you  receive  from  General 
McDowell,  through  his  aid,  Mr.  Kingsbury, 
orders  to  make  a  more  rapid  advance  ? 

"  Answer  :  No,  Sir !  I  did  not,  p.  206. 

January  22d,  General  Daniel  Tyler,  re-ex 
amined.  "  The  witness  said  :  I  made  one  mis 
take  in  my  testimony  when  before  the  Commit 
tee  on  Monday  last.  I  then  stated  that  I 
received  no  orders  from  General  McDowell  dur 
ing  the  day  of  the  battle  of  Bull- Run.  That 
was  an  error.  I  did  receive  an  order  from  him 
about  11  o'clock  in  the  morning  to  press  the 
attack." 

He  says,  "about  11  o'clock."  If  the  exact 
time  could  be  ascertained  it  would  be  found 
that  it  was  before  eleven  o'clock.  But  be  that 
as  it  may,  the  order  was  to  • '  press  forward  Jtis 
attack!"  The  how  and  the  where  were  abso 
lutely  at  Tyler's  discretion.  He  could  app]y 
his  troops  as  he  judged  best ;  and  if  the  enemy 
could  be  driven  off  and  the  passage  be  forced 
at  any  moment,  as  he  would  seem  to  intimate 
should  have  been  done,  there  was  nothing  to 
keep  him  from  doing  it.  The  simple,  emphatic, 
but  general  order  about  11  A.  M.,  was  to  "press 
forward  Ms  attack"  Under  this  order,  and  in 
the  exercise  of  his  discretion,  Tyler  did  not 
attempt  to  force  the  passage  of  the  bridge, 


54  MCDOWELL   AND    TYLER. 

which  was  then  defended  by  only  four  com 
panies. 

Let  us  see  what  Tyler  did  with  his  division  in 
this  affair.  Sherman  says  in  his  official  report, 
pp.  368-9 — after  reaching  his  position  near  the 
Stone-Bridge  6  A.  M.  :  "here  the  brigade  was 
deployed  in  line  along  the  skirt  of  timber,  and 
remained  quietly  in  position  till  after  10  A.  M. 
The  enemy  remained  very  quiet,"  &c.,  "  There 
we  remained  till  we  heard  the  musketry  fire 
across  Bull- Run,  showing  that  the  head  of 
Colonel  Hunter's  column  was  engaged.  The 
firing  was  brisk,  and  showed  that  Hunter  was 
driving  before  him  the  enemy  till  about  noon, 
when  it  became  certain  the  enemy  had  come  to 
a  stand,  and  that  our  forces  on  the  other  side 
of  Bull-Run  were  all  engaged — artillery  and 
infantry.  Here  you  (Tyler)  sent  me  the  order 
to  cross  over  with  the  whole  brigade  to  the  as 
sistance  of  Colonel  Hunter. 

"Early  in  the  day,  when reconnoitering  the 
ground,  I  had  seen  a  horseman  descend  from 
a  bluff  in  our  front,  cross  the  stream,  and  show 
himself  in  the  open  field  ;  and  inferring  we 
could  cross  over  at  the  same  point,  I  sent  for 
ward  a  company  as  skirmishers  and  followed 
with  the  whole  brigade.  We  found  no  diffi 
culty  in  crossing  over,  and  met  no  opposition 
in  ascending  the  steep  bluff  opposite." 

This  shows  that  Sherman  knew  "  early  in  the 


BULL   RUN   CAMPAIGN,  1861.  55 

day"  that  he  could  cross  the  stream,  but 
Tyler' s  orders  for  him  to  do  so  were  not  given 
until  "  about  noon,  when  it  became  certain  the 
enemy  had  come  to  a  stand  and  that  our  forces 
on  the  other  side  were  all  engaged— artillery 
and  infantry." 

Surely  this  was  not  pressing  forward  the 
attack  ? 

Tyler's  division  was  the  one  of  the  three 
active  divisions  which  had  the  shortest  line 
to  the  battle-field  (say  3  or  4  miles),  and 
should  have  done  the  most  fighting.  The  ob 
ject  of  the  long  and  tiresome  march  (some 
twelve  miles)  of  Hunter  and  Heintzelman,  was 
by  turning  the  enemy's  left  to  open  the  way 
for  Tyler's  command,  fresh  and  en  masse,  to 
reach  the  field  of  battle  by  a  single  stride.  But 
it  turned  out  that  the  divisions  which  did  the 
marching  had  also  to  do  most  of  the  fighting. 

To  return  to  Sherman  :  crossing  the  Run,  he 
says  :  u  I  learned  that  General  McDowell  was 
on  the  field.  I  sought  him  out,  and  received 
his  orders  to  join  in  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy." 
Though  his  brigade  took  an  active  part  in  the 
later  phases  of  the  action,  Sherman  saw  nothing 
more  of  Tyler  during  the  battle.  Tyler  says, 
in  his  report,  p.  349,  "  I  ordered  Colonel  Sher 
man,  with  his  brigade,  to  cross  Bull-Run,  and 
to  support  the  two  columns  already  in  action. 
Colonel  Sherman,  as  appears  by  his  report, 


56  MCDOWELL   AND    TYLER. 

crossed  the  Run  without  opposition,  and  after 
encountering  a  party  of  the  enemy  flying  be 
fore  Hunter's  forces,  found  General  McDowell, 
and  received  his  orders  to  join  in  the  pursuit. 
The  subsequent  operations  of  this  brigade  and 
its  able  commander  having  been  under  your 
own  eye  and  direction,  I  shall  not  follow  its 
movements  any  further." 

All  of  this  time  Tyler  was  not  only  under  the 
obligations  of  the  general  plan  of  battle,  but 
was  under  the  special  obligation  of  the  order 
he  had  received,  to  press  the  attack.  Yet  he 
nowhere  admits  that  he  acted  upon  that 
order,  on  the  contrary  he  still  acted  upon  his 
own  judgment.  He  says  in  his  report — p.  349: 
"As  soon  as  it  was  discovered  that  Hunters^ 
division  had  ~been  arrested,  I  ordered  up  Keyes' 
brigade."  Was  it  pressing  the  attack,  or  was 
it  soldiership,  if  there  had  been  no  such  orders, 
lying  on  the  flank  of  an  inferior  force  of  the 
enemy  to  wait  within  the  sound  of  Hunter's 
musketry  for  his  division  to  be  arrested?  "I 
ordered  Keyes'  brigade  to  follow  Sherman,  ac 
companying  the  movement  in  person,  as  I  saw 
it  must  necessarily  place  me  on  the  left  of  our 
line,  the  best  possible  position,  &*c.  I  ordered 
Colonel  Keyes  to  form  into  line  on  the  left  of 
Sherman's  brigade,"  says  Tyler.  McDowell's 
adjutant  General  was  sent  to  flnd  Tyler  and 
hurry  him  into  action.  En  route  he  passed 


BULL    RUN   CAMPAIGN,  1861.  57 

Sherman's  brigade;  met  Tyler  while  Keyes' 
brigade  was  still  marching  by  Hank  ;  told  him 
that  we  were  victorious,  to  form  line  to  the  left 
and  advance  up  the  slope  in  front.  Tyler  con 
tinues  in  his  report,  p.  394  :  "The  charge  was 
here  ordered  and  the  2nd  Maine  and  3rd  Con 
necticut  regiments,  which  were  opposed  to  this 
portion  of  the  enemy's  line,  pressed  forward 
to  the  top  of  the  hill  until  they  reached  the 
buildings  held  by  the  enemy  ;  drove  them 
out,  and  for  a  moment  had  them  in  posses 
sion.  At  this  point,  finding  the  brigade  under 
the  fire  of  a  strong  force  behind  breast- works, 
the  order  was  given  to  march  by  the  left 
flank  across  an  open  field  until  the  whole  line 
was  sheltered  by  the  right  bank  of  Bull- Run, 
along  which  the  march  was  continued,  &c. 
The  march  was  conducted  for  a  considerable 
distance  below  the  Stone-Bridge,  &c."  Keyes, 
in  his  report,  p.  353,  fixes  the  hour  at  which 
the  first,  and  it  may  be  said  the  last,  active 
service  of  his  brigade  was  rendered  in  the  fight. 
He  says— after  describing  his  crossing  of  the 
Run:— "  At  about  2  p.  M.  General  Tyler  ordered 
me  to  take  a  battery  on  a  height  in  front." 
After  the  attempt  to  do  that,  Keyes  says  in  his 
report :  "I  ordered  the  Maine  regiment  to  face 
to  the  left  flank  and  move  to  a  wooded  slope 
across  an  open  field,  to  which  point  I  followed 
them.  The  balance  of  the  brigade  soon  rejoined 


58  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 

me,    and  after  a  few  moments  rest,    I    again 
put  it  in  motion  and  moved  forward  to  find  an 
other  opportunity  to  charge."     This  movement 
forward  is  the  one  ' l  sheltered  by  the  right  bank 
of  Bull-Run,  already  mentioned  by  Tyler,  and 
this  is  the  brigade  which  Tyler  accompanied 
"in  person,    to   the  best  possible  position." 
Why  he  sent  Keyes  under  the  bluff  to  find  an 
other  "  opportunity  to  charge,"  is  not  disclosed 
by  the  records  of  the  rebellion.  The  fact  is,  that 
after  that  one   "charge"  was  made  by  Keyes' 
brigade,  about  2  P.  M.  it  filed  off  and  marched 
along,  under  the  bluff,  and  did  no  more  fight 
ing.      Keyes  confirms  this.      He  says  in  his 
report,  p.  354:  "I  continued  my  march  and 
sent  my  Aide,  Lieut.  Walter,   to  the  rear*  to 
inquire  of  General  McDowell  how  the  day  was 
going  ?     The  discontinuance  of  the  firing  in  our 
lines  becoming    more   and  more   apparent,    I 
inclined  to  the  right,  and  after  marching  six 
hundred  or  seven  hundred  yards  farther,  I  was 
met  by  Lieut,  E.  Upton,  Aide  to  General  Tyler, 
and  ordered  to  file  to  the  right,  as  our  troops 
were  retreating.     I  moved   on  at  an  ordinary 
pace,  and  fell  into  the  retreating  column. 
*    *     "  At  the  moment  I  received  the  order  to 
retreat  and  for  some  time  afterwards,  it  (his 
brigade)  was  in  as  good  order  as  in  the  morning 

*  McDowell  was  in  front. 


BULL    BUN    CAMPAIGN, 


on  the  road."  Military  readers,  especially 
those  who  are  acquainted  with  the  Bull-Run 
affair,  can  analyze  the  foregoing  facts  for  them 
selves.  It  may  be  added  that  Keyes'  brigade 
of  "about  2,500  men,"  as  he  reported  it, 
shows : — killed,  no  officers,  19  enlisted  men  ; 


FIELD   ABOUT   TIME   UNION   EETEEAT   BEGAN,  JULY    21ST. 

wounded,  4  officers  and  46  enlisted  men.  Sher 
man' s  brigade  which  fought  under  McDowell's 
personal  orders,  lost :— killed,  3  officers  and 
117  enlisted  men  ;  wounded,  15  officers,  193 
enlisted  men. 


60  MCDOWELL    AND    TYLER. 

Neither  Schenck's  brigade  of  Tyler's  divisio 
nor  Tyler's  Artillery,  crossed  Bull-Run  durii 
the  battle.  After  8  o'clock  the  Stone-Brid^ 
was  defended  by  only  a  handful  of  skirmisher 
The  turnpike  was  obstructed  by  some  falL 
trees.  Ordinary  vigor  and  industry  wou 
have  carried  the  bridge  and  cleared  the  pi] 
in  a  few  minutes.  Tyler  testifies,  that  about 
A.  M.  he  received  orders  to  press  the  attack, 
he  had  pushed  his  division,  or  merely  tl 
fine  regular  batteries  of  Ayers  and  Carlis 
into  the  contest,  as  late  even  as  2  o'clock,  ] 
might  have  saved  the  day  and  averted  tl 
consequences  of  his  delay  in  the  mornin 
Tyler's  three  brigades,  Sherman's,  Keyes'  ai 
Schenck's  were  from  6  o'clock  in  the  mornir 
concentrated  near  the  Stone-Bridge,  in  front 
Evans  until  about  8  A.  M.  and  on  his  flank  ar 
not  more  than  a  mile  from  it,  after  he  left  tl 
Stone-Bridge  and  formed  a  line  of  battle  perpe 
dicular  to  Tyler' s  front — which  he  had  done  by 
A.  M.,  to  resist  the  attack  of  Hunter  andHein 
zelman.  Tyler  was  on  the  ground  with  the; 
three  fresh  brigades  and  his  artillery  in  han< 
and  with  McDowell' s  orders  to  press  the  attacl 
anl  was  informed  of  the  progress  of  the  flankir 
divisions  by  his  staff  officers  who  observed  tl 
movements  from  tree- tops,  as  Tyler  says  in  h 
report.  What  he  did  under  these  circumstai 
ces  is  shown  in  the  records  of  which  an  outlii 


BULL   RUN   CAMPAIGN,    1861.  61 

has  been  given.  His  own  services  in  that  battle 
do  not  justify  him,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  in 
criticising  McDowell.  Except  in  the  one  par 
ticular  of  the  delay  in  the  morning,  McDowell 
made  no  complaint  against  Tyler  on  the  21st, 
though  he  fully  understood  the  facts  in  the  case. 
The  battle  was  lost,  and  he  chose  to  let  the 
blame  rest  upon  his  own  shoulders  rather  than 
place  any  part  of  it  upon  his  subordinates. 

The  object  of  this  article  is  to  repel  the 
direct  and  outrageous  attack  made  upon 
McDowell,  not  to  praise  him.  But  the  occasion 
seems  appropriate  for  citing  an  analysis  of  him, 
made  by  Secretary  Chase  in  a  letter  to  a  friend, 
dated  Sept.  4,  1862.  (Warden's  " account  of 
the  private  and  public,  services  of  Salmon  P. 
Chase/') 

"  McDowell  has  been  unfortunate,  but  he  is 
a  loyal,  brave,  truthful,  capable  officer.  He  is 
a  disciplinarian.  While  he  never  hesitated  to 
appropriate  private  property  of  rebels  to  public 
use,  he  suppressed,  as  far  as  possible,  private 
marauding  as  incompatible  with  the  laws  of 
civilized  war,  and  equally  incompatible  with 
the  efficiency  of  troops.  Then  he  never  drinks, 
or  smokes,  or  chews,  or  indulges  in  any  kind 
of  license.  He  is  serious  and  earnest.  He 
resorts  to  no  acts  of  popularity.  He  has  no 
political  aims,  and  perhaps  not  any  very  pro 
nounced  political  opinions,  except  the  convic- 


62  MCDOWELL   AND    TYLER. 

tion  that  this  war  sprung  from  the  influences 
of  slavery,  and  that  whenever  slavery  stands 
in  the  way  of  successful  prosecution,  slavery 
must  get  out  of  the  way.  He  is  too  indifferent 
in  manner.  His  officers  are  sometimes  alien 
ated  by  it.  He  is  too  purely  military  in  his 
intercourse  with  his  soldiers.  There  is  an 
apparent  hauteur — no,  that  is  not  the  word- 
rough  indifference  expresses  better  the  idea, 
in  his  way  towards  them,  that  makes  it  hard 
for  them  to  feel  any  warm  personal  sentiment 
towards  him,  unless  they  find,  what  they 
hitherto  have  not  found,  that  he  leads  them 
successfully,  and  the  honor  of  serving  under 
him  compensates  for  their  grief." 

The  communication  in  the  Post  says  :  u  The 
true  and  full  history  of  the  War  of  the  Rebel 
lion  cannot  be  written  until  sufficient  time  has 
elapsed  to  allow  the  many  diaries,  letters,  and 
private  papers  of  the  chief  participants  in  its 
stirring  scenes  to  be  made  accessible  by  their 
death."  Diaries,  letters,  &c.,  are  valuable  data 
for  history,but  as  much  cannot  be  said  for  recol 
lections  recorded  twenty  years  after  stirring 
scenes,  especially  if  they  are  prepared  without 
referring  to  the  reports,  diaries,  &c.,  made  at 
the  tim  e.  Death  is  valuable  to  history  by  giving 
to  the  public  the  diaries,  letters,  &c.,  of  par 
ticipants  in  stirring  military  scenes,  and  also 
by  putting  an  end  to  the  new  versions  of  those 


BULL   RUN   CAMPAIGN,  1861.  63 

scenes  which,  the  participants  issue  from  time 
to  time  as  they  pass  on  in  life  Vanity,  interest 
and  prejudice  work  against  memory.  The  oper 
ations  of  war  appeal  strongly  to  the  imagin 
ation,  and  latter  day  recollections  in  some 
instances  illuminate,  in  others,  obscure  the 
truth. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 
LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


22Apr5oFRf 

atrr'D  LP 

RC.O  •* 

A  no  °ft  1959 

APR  <"°  l 

/^>C^L^6^ 

•  k  t*v->r~  t*.      1 

ER-LlBRARY 
LOAN 

F^BIO  1971 

LD  21A~50m-9,'58 
(6889slO)476B 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


£472 


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